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SENTENCE APPEALS IN ENGLAND: PROMOTING




When the Supreme Court mandated in Booker v. United
States' that the federal courts of appeals review all criminal
sentences for reasonableness in 2005, it opened the way for
significant expansion of the appellate role in sentencing. Before
Booker, the federal courts of appeals played only a very minor
role in sentencing. Defendants did not have a right to appeal
their sentences until 1889, and when they were finally granted
that right, the federal courts of appeals chose to conduct only a
very deferential review, primarily limited to review for some
type of legal error.2 The federal courts of appeals continued to
play a more limited role in the sentencing process after the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the development of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines (the "Guidelines," "federal
Guidelines," or "Sentencing Guidelines").3 Their role was
primarily an enforcement one, concentrated on ensuring that
sentencing courts did not stray far from the strictures of the
* Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law. My deepest thanks to
Andrew Ashworth, Jonathan Bild, and Julian Roberts for their thoughtful comments and
advice on the English portions of my research. I also owe thanks to Beth Colgan, Jelani
Jefferson Exum, George Fisher, Andrew Gilden, Carissa Hessick, Norman Spaulding, and
Robert Weisberg for their valuable comments.
1. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
2. See generally Briana Rosenbaum, Righting the Historical Record: A Case for
Appellate Jurisdiction over Appeals of Sentences for Reasonableness under 28 U.S. C.
1291, 62 Hastings L.J. 865, 875-99 (2011).
3. See id. at 899-900.
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Guidelines.4 The federal courts of appeals deferred to the
sentencing judgments of both the district courts and the United
States Sentencing Commission (the "Sentencing Commission"),
the institution tasked by Congress with developing the
Sentencing Guidelines on almost all issues of sentencing law
and principles.
Even after Booker, when the Supreme Court made the
Guidelines advisory and mandated a broad substantive
reasonableness review of sentences, the federal courts of appeals
have largely rejected the unprecedented opportunity to take a
more active role in the sentencing process. They have
interpreted Booker's reasonableness review narrowly, upholding
sentences so long as district courts consider the purposes of
sentencing set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)-just punishment,
deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation-when
making their sentencing decisions. Courts of appeals usually
will not question the relative weights the sentencing courts place
on those purposes, despite the fact that the weight a court
attributes to a particular sentencing purpose (say rehabilitation
versus protection of the public) often invokes vital questions of
sentencing law and policy touching a broader class of cases
throughout the criminal justice system.
One of the more prominent examples of this deferential
enforcement approach to appellate review is the Supreme
Court's decision in Kimbrough v. United States,5 in which the
Supreme Court held that district courts could decide whether to
reject the old 100-to-one crack-to-powder ratio in the Sentencing
Guidelines.6 After Kimbrough, it is entirely up to the judgment
of individual district judges whether to treat crack-cocaine
4. See id. For excellent arguments regarding the failure of the Sentencing Commission
and the federal courts to create a uniform and meaningful common law of sentencing under
the federal Guidelines, see Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for this Age of Federal
Sentencing: The Opportunity and Need for Judicial Lawmaking, 11 Stan. L. & Policy Rev.
93 (1999); see also Nancy Gertner, Sentencing Reform: When Everyone Behaves Badly, 57
Me. L. Rev. 569, 576-77 (2005); Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing
Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 901 (1991); Marc Miller,
Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 413 (1992); Kate Stith & Jos6 A. Cabranes,
Fear ofJudging: Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal Courts (U. Chi. Press 1998).
5. 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
6. Id. at 91.
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offenses more harshly than powder-cocaine offenses.7 Such an
approach to sentencing design, which leaves fundamental
decisions of sentencing policy to the individual judgment of
each district judge, can have troubling consequences, including
unwarranted sentencing disparity, lack of transparency in
sentencing, overreliance on the guidelines to justify sentences,
and uncertainty for defendants facing sentencing.8 This heavy
deference to trial courts creates more than just an inconsistency
problem. It is more deeply problematic that the resulting
disparity is of such broad issues of policy that we would in other
contexts normally consider them to be issues of law.
One possible way to fix this problem and promote uniform
application of sentencing law would be to expand appellate
review to further a common law of sentencing independent of
the Sentencing Guidelines. To do so would expand the
lawmaking function of the federal courts of appeals, but would
leave untouched their enforcement function related to the
Guidelines.9 This expansion of the appellate lawmaking function
is uniquely desirable in the post-Booker sentencing regime
because the advisory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines has
undermined their intended function: to further sentencing
consistency. Substantive reasonableness review can fill the gap
that has resulted. As others before me have explained, the
federal courts of appeals could use such review as an
opportunity to articulate "general rules over time in the areas of
policymaking and policy articulation" that would provide
consistency and uniformity in sentencing, but that would also
allow judges to consider individual circumstances.' 0 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has pointed out that appellate review is to play a
7. See Gerard E. Lynch, Letting Guidelines Be Guidelines (and Judges Be Judges),
OSJCL Amici: Views from the Field, 5 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. (Jan. 2008), http://osjclblog
spot.com (criticizing the current appellate model that effectively places power to determine
matters of criminal policy in the hands of individual judges) (accessed Sept. 16, 2013; copy
on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
8. See discussion infra Part II(B).
9. The concept of a dual appellate model--enforcement and lawmaking-originated
in Professor Reitz's article on this topic. See Kevin Reitz, Sentencing Guidelines Systems
and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison ofFederal and State Experiences, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev.
1441, 1450-51 (1997).
10. Michael M. O'Hear, Appellate Review of Sentences: Reconsidering Deference, 51
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2123, 2166 (2010).
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primary role in maintaining uniformity and reducing disparity in
the post-Booker advisory-Guidelines sentencing system.
Despite this potential, the appellate lawmaking role has
been largely ignored since Booker. The primary focus has been
enforcement-that is, sorting out how the courts of appeals can
continue to ensure compliance with the Guidelines in an
advisory-Guidelines world.12  The failure to consider the
appellate lawmaking role is unfortunate, for "appellate review of
sentences may present the best hope" for balancing the need for
a common law of sentencing with the need for individualized
sentences.
Considering the heightened importance placed on appellate
review in the post-Booker world, we ought to be thinking
critically about whether the current design of federal appellate
review actually furthers the goal of uniformity in sentencing.
Unfortunately, notwithstanding the attention given to the
question of whether a common law body of sentencing
jurisprudence is a proper objective, few scholars writing after
Booker have explored the practical administration of a robust
model of appellate review in the federal system.14 This is
perhaps because we don't have the historical knowledge to
understand how robust appellate review-characterized by both
lawmaking and enforcement functions-would work in the
context of advisory guidelines. In an article analyzing the
Booker opinion shortly after it was issued, for example, one
11. Booker, 543 U.S. at 264-65 (forecasting that reasonableness review "will continue
to move sentencing in Congress'[s] preferred direction, helping to avoid excessive
sentencing disparities while maintaining flexibility sufficient to individualize sentences
where necessary"); Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 107 ("[A]dvisory Guidelines combined with
appellate review for reasonableness and ongoing revision of the Guidelines in response to
sentencing practices will help to 'avoid excessive sentencing disparities."' (quoting
Booker, 543 U.S. at 264)).
12. O'Hear, supra n. 10, at 2166 ("With so much attention focused on the ultimately
inconclusive guidelines debate, scholars and policymakers have neglected the role of
appellate courts in the sentencing process-except insofar as the appellate courts police
guidelines compliance.").
13. Id.
14. See e.g. Douglas A. Berman, Rita, Reasoned Sentencing, and Resistance to
Change, 85 Denv. U. L. Rev. 7, 24 (2007) (suggesting that federal courts of appeals should
"contribute to the reasoned development of principled and purposeful sentencing law and
policy"); Nancy Gertner, Rita Needs Gall-How to Make the Guidelines Advisory,
85 Denv. U. L. Rev. 63, 70-71 (2007) (generally envisioning the development of a
common law of guidelines precedents).
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commentator explained that the Supreme Court's mandate for
substantive review of criminal sentences "takes the federal
system into uncharted waters" because "[n]o state system has
ever conjoined meaningful sentence review with voluntary
guidelines."15
In this article, I use comparative method to fill that gap,
examining appellate review of criminal sentences in England
and Wales,' and using that examination to reconsider appellate
review in the federal courts of appeals. In contrast to the review
conducted in the federal courts of appeals, appellate review of
criminal sentences in England is quite robust. The English Court
of Appeal-Criminal Division has a hundred-year-long history of
appellate-court development of sentencing principles through
common-law review of sentencing decisions. In addition to
filling this lawmaking role, that court has also long been
responsible for enforcement of England's guidelines.
Although other scholars have studied the English system of
robust appellate review and its ability to further a common-law
body of sentencing jurisprudence, these comparative studies are
close to forty years old, and all were conducted before the
development of the English Sentencing Guidelines in the
1980s. No scholar has offered a comparative study of the
modem design of the Court of Appeal in England, which
continues to perform its historically robust lawmaking role while
enforcing England's modem Sentencing Guidelines.
Accordingly, this study provides new insights into how review
in the federal courts of appeals can be expanded to promote a
common law of sentencing, while at the same time enforcing the
post-Booker advisory Guidelines.
The appellate court in England conducts de novo review of
sentencing law and principles to develop a common law of
sentencing independent of the English sentencing guidelines.
That is, England's Court of Appeal furthers sentencing
consistency through its robust appellate lawmaking role, rather
than simply through enforcement of the Guidelines. Through
this approach, England has applied robust appellate review in a
15. Kevin R. Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Constitutional Law
at Cross-Purposes, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1082, 1114 n. 120 (2005).
16. In the interest of brevity, I refer to England and Wales together as "England."
17. See Part III(A), infra.
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guidelines system that both: (1) provides sentencing courts with
the necessary benchmarks to guide the sentencing decision, and
(2) gives sentencing courts the discretion and flexibility they
need to assure individualized sentences. The English model thus
suggests a new way to design the role of the federal courts of
appeals: moving from bodies that merely enforce guidelines to
further consistency of sentencing outcomes to bodies that
develop sentencing law in a way that furthers consistency of
sentencing approach.
Ultimately, I suggest that federal appellate courts borrow
aspects of the English "mixed deference" model of appellate
review. My model calls for de novo review of sentencing law
and principles-including review of guidelines interpretations
and decisions on how to weigh the statutory purposes of
sentencing-but deferential review of other aspects of the
sentencing calculation-including fact-finding, the application
of sentencing principles and law to the facts, and the choice of
actual sentence. The aim is to design the appellate role to
provide guidance to sentencing courts and further a common law
of sentencing, but to do so in a way that (1) is not anchored in
the Guidelines, (2) keeps the bulk of the sentencing decision in
the hands of the trial court, and (3) is limited to the issues that
the courts of appeals best handle: sentencing law and policy.
II. REASONABLENESS REVIEW IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS
A. Booker and Substantive Reasonableness Review
Booker represented the culmination of a line of cases
interpreting the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a right to a
jury trial in the context of sentencing. In Apprendi v. New
Jersey,18 for example, the Court had held that "any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt."19 In Booker, the Court applied this Apprendi
rule to the Guidelines, holding them unconstitutional because a
18. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
19. Id. at 490.
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judge-not a jury-found facts that determined the allowable
guidelines range and thus "determined the upper limits of
sentencing."20
The Booker Court discussed several options for remedying
this unconstitutional deficiency, including: (1) requiring that any
facts necessary to impose punishment be submitted to the jury,
(2) declaring the federal Guidelines unconstitutional in their
entirety, and (3) rendering the Guidelines advisory.21 Ultimately,
the Court chose the third option, rendering the Guidelines
advisory. Under the now-advisory Guidelines, district judges
need only "consult [the] Guidelines and take them into account
when sentencing," but are "not bound" to follow them.22 As
Justice Stevens explained, "when a trial judge exercises his
discretion to select a specific sentence within a defined range,
the defendant has no right to a ury determination of the facts
that the judge deems relevant." After Booker, district judges
must consider "all of the § 3553(a) factors to determine whether
they support the sentence" and only then, after making "an
individualized assessment based on the facts presented," can the
judge decide whether an outside-guidelines or inside-guidelines
sentence is warranted.24
The Court recognized that its decision to render the
Sentencing Guidelines advisory-and thereby greatly expand
the discretion of sentencing judges-undermined Congress's
original intent to increase sentencing uniformity.25 To at least
partially remedy this problem, the Court read into the
26Sentencing Reform Act a "reasonableness" standard of review.
The courts of appeals must now review all sentences for
reasonableness, "irrespective of whether the trial judge
sentences within or outside the guidelines range,"27 as this
reasonableness review will "tend to iron out sentencing
20. Booker, 543 U.S. at 236; see also id. at 243-44 (invoking Apprendi and noting the
Court's recognition that "in some cases jury factfinding may impair the most expedient and
efficient sentencing of defendants").
21. Id. at 246-68 (remedial opinion).
22. Id. at 264.
23. Id. at 233.
24. Gall v. U.S., 552 U.S. 38, 49-50 (2007).
25. Booker, 543 U.S. at 263-64.
26. Id. at 264.
27. Id. at 260.
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differences" and "promote uniformity in the sentencing
process." 28
Reasonableness review contains two parts: procedural and
substantive. Procedural reasonableness review is the clearest and
less controversial of the two. This is both because the Court has
provided clear guidance on what is involved in procedural
reasonableness review and because appellate courts have been
engaging in some form of procedural review for decades. As the
Court has explained, then, procedural reasonableness review
entails courts' examining sentences for procedural error,
such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the
Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory,
failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a
sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to
adequately explain the chosen sentence-including an
explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.29
The second, more controversial, aspect of reasonableness
review is substantive reasonableness review, for which the Court
has provided far less guidance. In Gall, the Court explained that
substantive reasonableness review equated to "a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard," 30 and that the courts of appeals
"must review all sentences-whether inside, just outside, or
significantly outside the Guidelines range"-for abuse of
discretion, taking into account the "totality of the
circumstances." 31 However, apart from offering this general
"totality" standard, the Court has offered little guidance on just
how deferential substantive reasonableness review should be.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the appropriate
appellate review is deferential, stressing that the sentencing
judge "has greater familiarity with . . . the individual case and
the individual defendant before him than the Commission or the
appeals court" and "is therefore in a superior position to find
facts and judge their import under § 3353(a) in each particular
case."32 The Court has also suggested that a "closer review" of a
sentence that deviates from the Guidelines is appropriate if the
28. Id. at 263.
29. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 41, 51.
32. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109 (quotations omitted).
88
CONSISTENT SENTENCING THROUGH ROBUST APPELLATE REVIEW
deviation is based solely on a policy disagreement with the
Guidelines. 33 Furthermore, when a sentence varies from the
Guidelines, the Court allows-but does not require-apellate
courts to "take the degree of variance into account." And
similarly, the Court has said that appellate courts may-but are
not required to-presume that a within-guidelines sentence is
reasonable. 35
As can be expected, this inconsistent and incomplete
description of substantive reasonableness review has led to
equally inconsistent and incomplete applications in the circuit
courts. As a number of scholars have observed, approaches
among and within the courts of appeals vary widely, from those
that are highly deferential to district courts' sentencing decisions
to those undertaking a closer review of the justifications for
sentences. 36 Indeed, one analysis of substantive-reasonableness-
review decisions in the Eleventh Circuit described the court's
approach as "wildly inconsistent," varying from review that
looks like de novo review of sentencing factors to quick
affirmations of sentences "with no meaningful analysis at all."37
These inconsistencies have led to widespread criticism
throughout the academy.38
To further illustrate the various approaches of the federal
appellate courts, I will borrow the approach that places appellate
judgments into two "camps." 39 The first camp is "extremely
deferential to the district court."4 0 So long as the district court
follows the proper procedures, considers the § 3553(a) factors,
and makes a decision that is within reason, courts of appeal in
Camp I will not disturb it.41 The second camp is "less deferential
33. Id.
34. Gall, 552 U.S. at 47.
35. Rita v. U.S., 551 U.S. 338, 347, 354 (2007).
36. See e.g. Lindsay C. Harrison, Appellate Discretion and Sentencing After Booker, 62
U. Miami L. Rev. 1115, 1138-53 (2008); Adam Shajnfeld, The Eleventh Circuit's Selective
Assault on Sentencing Discretion, 65 U. Miami L. Rev. 1133, 1137-38, 1154-57 (2011);
Craig D. Rust, Student Author, When "Reasonableness" Is Not So Reasonable: The Need
to Restore Clarity to the Appellate Review of Federal Sentencing Decisions After Rita,
Gall, and Kimbrough, 26 Touro L. Rev. 75, 90-91 (2010).
37. Harrison, supra n. 36, at 1118.
38. See supra n. 36 (citing authorities).
39. Rust, supra n. 36, at 90-91.
40. Id. at 91.
41. Id.
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to the district court."42 Review by courts in Camp II usually
includes some amount of "re-weighing" of facts in re-evaluating
the "district court's decision-making calculus in terms of the
weight the judge assigned to each of Congress's stated
sentencing goals, as set forth in § 3553(a)."43
1. The Camp I Approach: Kimbrough
A majority of substantive reasonableness review decisions
are characterized by the Camp I, deferential approach.4 A
famous example of this deferential approach to reasonableness
review is Kimbrough, in which the Supreme Court held that
federal courts of appeals must defer to district court decisions on
whether to reject the old 100-to-one crack-to-powder ratio in the
Sentencing Guidelines. 45  Kimbrough had pleaded guilty to
several drug-related offenses, including possession with intent to
distribute more than fifty grams of crack cocaine, which made
him subject to a much higher Guideline sentence than if his
offense had involved only powder.46  Accordingly, the
sentencing range recommended by the Guidelines was roughly
twenty years. The district judge instead sentenced Kimbrough
42. Id.
43. Id. at 91, 101 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
44. Sarah M. R. Cravens, Judging Discretion: Contexts for Understanding the Role of
Judgment, 64 U. Miami L. Rev. 947, 966 (2010); cf Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing
Cornnn., Prepared Testimony before H.R. Subcomm. on Crime Terrorism, and Homeland
Security, http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Saris%2010122011 .pdf 15-17 (Oct. 12,
2011) (discussing the general dissatisfaction of circuit court judges with "substantive
reasonableness review" and the resulting inclination to find some "procedural hook" to
justify vacating a sentence) (accessed Sept. 16, 2013; copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process); Gerard E. Lynch, J., U.S. Ct. of App. For the Second Cir.,
Statement, in Hearing before U.S. Sentencing Commn., http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative
andPublic Affairs/PublicHearings-andMeetings/20120215-16/HearingTranscript_20
120216.pdf 170-71 (Feb 16, 2012) (noting that appellate judges are "very reluctant to get
pushed into" deeper appellate review of sentencing decisions and that "it's going to be a
tough sell to appellate judges to get them to scrutinize any but outlier sentences") (accessed
Sept. 16, 2013; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process); see also infra
n. 76 and accompanying text.
45. Kimbrough, 522 U.S. at 91, 111.
46. Id. at 91-93. Under the then-existing Guidelines, a defendant holding one gram of
crack cocaine was punished as if it were 100 grams of powder cocaine. Id at 91 (citing 21
U.S.C. § 841 and Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1).
47. Id. at 92 (describing Guidelines-based calculation that yielded sentence of between
nineteen years and twenty-two and a half years).
90
CONSISTENT SENTENCING THROUGH ROBUST APPELLATE REVIEW
to the mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years, in part
because he disagreed with the 100-to-one ratio, and he noted in
his opinion that the case exemplified the "disproportionate and
unjust effect that crack cocaine guidelines have in sentencing.'
The Fourth Circuit vacated that sentence, finding a sentence
outside the Guidelines range per se unreasonable when based on
a "disagreement" with the Guidelines themselves.49
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a sentencing
judge may deviate from the Guidelines if "a within-Guidelines
sentence is 'geater than necessary' to serve the objectives of
sentencing,"5 and that the decision to deviate from the
crack/powder ratio for policy reasons was reasonable in
Kimbrough's situation.5 ' After Kimbrough, then, courts of
appeals must review decisions that deviate from the Guidelines
under the same standard applied to all post-Booker sentences:
reasonableness.52
While the Court's decision may be lauded for its reasoned
rejection of a greatly reviled sentencing policy, the most striking
part of the Kimbrough decision for the purpose of this article is
what the Court did not hold: that the crack/powder ratio is
unwarranted as a matter of law. The Court instead left this to the
discretion of individual district judges, even though it failed to
provide district courts with any guidance on either: (1) how to
decide whether to follow the ratio, or (2) what a new ratio might
look like.
2. The Camp IApproach Meets the Camp II Approach: McBride
The majority and dissenting opinions in United States v.
McBride53 illustrate both reviewing courts' typical hesitation to
48. Id. at 93.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 91.
51. Id. at 110-11.
52. Id. at 111 (noting that the "ultimate question" is "whether the sentence was
reasonable," in that it was both supported by-and could be justified by-application of
the sentencing factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)); see also id. at 97-112 (concluding
that Kimbrough's sentence was reasonable in part because the Sentencing Commission had
not exercised its "characteristic institutional role" by consulting empirical evidence or
referring to national experience and the crack/powder ratio produced sentences that were
unwarranted and inconsistent with the purposes of punishment described in § 3553(a)).
53. 511 F.3d 1293 (llth Cir. 2007).
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provide guidance on sentencing policy and the more active
approach to sentence review. The facts are straightforward:
McBride pleaded guilty to distribution of child pornography
after he was found with hundreds of photos and videos of child
pornography, some involving prepubescent minors and sadistic
or masochistic material.54 He had an extensive history of
physically abusing and molesting children; had admitted being
sexually attracted to children; had violated a court order to stay
away from children; and had already failed in several treatment
programs. The Guidelines recommended a prison term ranging
from thirteen to sixteen years, but the district court sentenced
McBride to only seven years in prison followed by ten years of
supervised release citing the extreme hardship that he had
endured as a child.36 Indeed, the district-court opinion called the
defendant's history-which included violent physical abuse by
his mother and uncle at age two and sexual abuse by his
grandfather-"perha s one of the worst histories" the district
judge had ever seen.
The government appealed, calling the sentence
substantively unreasonable because the district court had put too
much weight on the defendant's past hardship and not enough
on the need for incapacitating a repeat pedophile. The Eleventh
Circuit observed on appeal that the district court had considered
the need to protect the public.5 9 In light of this, the Court
affirmed the sentence as reasonable, despite suggesting that it
was uncomfortable with the district court's sentencing choice:
Even if we were to disagree with the weight that the district
court gave to Defendant's history of abuse, we will only
reverse a procedurally proper sentence if we are 'left with
the definite and firm conviction that the district court
committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the
§ 3553(a) factors.o
54. Id. at 1295.
55. Id. at 1295-96.
56. Id. at 1296.
57. Id. at 1298.
58. Id. at 1296-98.
59. Id. at 1298.
60. Id. at 1297.
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In contrast, the McBride dissent would have found the
sentence substantively unreasonable for overvaluing the
defendant's past hardship and not sufficiently considering "the
seriousness of the offense, the need for deterrence, and the need
to protect the public." 61 Not only was the sentence too low,
according to the dissenting judge, but he asserted that nothing
less than "a term of lifetime supervised release" would
adequately protect the public.62
This juxtaposition provides a particularly clear example of
the two camps. The McBride majority follows the deferential
approach used in Kimbrough: The goal is simply to determine
whether the sentence can be justified, and so long as the
sentencing court has some basis in reason to justify the sentence,
the appellate court will not interfere. After McBride, it is up to
district judges in the Eleventh Circuit to determine whether a
defendant's past hardship should be a mitigating factor in a case
involving possession of child pornography, and, if it should be,
when. But what purposes of punishment are fulfilled by taking
past hardship into account? Does a background of hardship
make the defendant less culpable because it caused his later
pedophilia? If not, is mitigation merely an act of mercy? And is
showing mercy a proper consideration in such a case? Under a
Camp I process, district judges must formulate, and then answer,
these questions for themselves. They have no guidance on how
to deal with similarly situated defendants in subsequent cases.
But the McBride dissent hits these issues head on, stating
clearly that deterrence is key: "Allowing someone who will
unquestionably continue to remain a danger to society's most
vulnerable citizens-its children-to live free of any restrictions
at any age, let alone at such a young age . . . is substantively
unreasonable."63 District judges required to sentence pedophiles
under such a rubric would know how to structure the evaluation
of a similar case.
3. The Camp I Approach: Pugh, Amezcua-Vasquez, and Padilla
Examples of the less deferential, Camp II, approach to
61. Id. at 1299 (Dubina, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 1300.
63. Id.
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appellate review include United States v. Pugh,64 United States
65 66v. Amezcua-Vasquez,65 and U.S. v. Jayyousi (Padilla). In Pugh,
the Eleventh Circuit held that a sentence of only five years'
probation was unreasonable for a defendant who had
unintentionally downloaded child pornography. 67 In finding
Pugh's sentence unreasonable, the Eleventh Circuit discussed
several philosophies of punishment that were ill-served by a
sentence of probation, including the need for deterrence of
crimes that create an incentive for the production of child
pornography and the need to treat the crime of child
pornography seriously. 68
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in Amezcua-Vasquez
overturned a sentence of four years and four months as
substantively unreasonable because the district court had applied
a sixteen-level sentence enhancement based on a twenty-five-
year-old violent felony.69 Although the Ninth Circuit agreed that
the old felony conviction was an aggravating factor, it held that
the district judge should have taken the age of the conviction
into account in setting the amount of the enhancement.70
And in the case involving Jos6 Padilla, the Eleventh Circuit
held that a seventeen-year sentence for inciting terrorism-
twelve years below the Guidelines level-was substantively
unreasonable.7 1 Holding that the district court gave too much
weight to the fact that Padilla had allegedly been tortured during
pretrial confinement 72 and noting that the district court also
64. 515 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2008). Like McBride, Pugh was decided by the Eleventh
Circuit, whose practice of applying conflicting levels of deference in substantive
reasonableness decisions has been subject to criticism. See supra n. 36 (collecting
commentary).
65. 567 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2009).
66. 657 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2011) (including U.S. v. Padilla).
67. Pugh, 515 at 1182-83.
68. Id. at 1194-99.
69. 567 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2009).
70. Id. at 1055-56. The Ninth Circuit's criticisms of the illegal re-entry Guidelines in
Amezcua-Vasquez ultimately resulted in changes to the Guidelines. See Jennifer Niles
Coffin, Where Procedure Meets Substance: Making the Most of the Need for Adequate
Explanation in Federal Sentencing, 36-MAR Champion 36, 38 n. 43 (2012).
71. U.S. v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1117-19 (11th Cir. 2011) (including US. v.
Padilla).
72. Id. at 1118.
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failed to consider his "terrorism training,"73 the Eleventh Circuit
emphasized the importance of incapacitating terrorists, who "are
unique among criminals in the likelihood of recidivism the
difficulty of rehabilitation, and the need for incapacitation." 4
Despite the promise of these Camp II examples, there is
reason to doubt that meaningful appellate guidance on
sentencing principles will become the norm. First, these types of
opinions are rare, as most courts are highly deferential when
faced with substantive reasonableness appeals. One recent
study of appellate reasonableness review decisions shows that,
in the six years since the Supreme Court's decision in Gall, the
federal courts of appeals had by the summer of 2013 reversed
only forty-four sentences for substantive unreasonableness-
twent as unreasonably high and twenty-four as unreasonably
low.7 Furthermore, when the courts of appeals provide more
meaningful and binding sentencing guidance, they usually do so
only when forced to justify the rare decisions in which they hold
sentences unreasonable. Thus, as Pugh, Amezcua- Vasquez, and
Padilla demonstrate, appellate guidance on sentencing policy is
often prescriptive and provides guidance for only the outer
fringes of acceptable sentencing choice. By issuing lawmaking
judgments in these very safe fringe cases, appellate courts are
engaging in the most limited lawmaking role; they are merely
policing the edges of sentencing discretion.
And a final reason to doubt the future viability of the Camp
II approach is the fact that it is subject to considerable criticism.
For example, one commentator characterized the Pugh court's
"overreach" in conducting what the author called "de novo
review" rather than reviewing for abuse of discretion.77 Another
accused the Eleventh Circuit of "ignoring Gall" and failing to
give sufficient deference to the discretion of the sentencing
73. Id. at 1117.
74. Id. at 1117 (quoting U.S. v. Meskini, 319 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2003)).
75. See n. 44, supra (collecting authorities).
76. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Office of Defender Services, Sentencing
Resource Counsel, Appellate Decisions after Gall, http://www.fd.org/docs/select-topics---
sentencing/app ct decisions_1ist.pdf (Aug. 9, 2013) (accessed Sept. 17, 2013; copy on file
with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
77. See Harrison, supra n. 36, at 1152.
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court.7 8 And, after Amezcua- Vasquez, a third accused the Ninth
Circuit of "creat[ing] an unjustified exception to uniformly
deferential review" that ultimately "undermines the Ninth
Circuit's policy of promoting district court discretion." 7 9
B. Negative Consequences ofDeferential Review
The above analysis reveals several negative consequences
of deferential review. First, it raises the potential for application
of different sentencing policies throughout the judicial system.
This point has been ably made in a critique of Kimbrough that
characterizes the Supreme Court as "[g]ranting district courts
leeway on how to value the different factors," noting that this
"would mean that different courts sentence under different rules
of law."80 Under such a scheme, "[o]ne court might heavily
value the reduction of disparity, for example, while another
might most heavily favor parsimony."81 Judge Lynch of the
Second Circuit once articulated a similar concern, arguing
persuasively that "we cannot have a coherent public policy on
narcotics if half the sentencing judges are fighting a 'war on
drugs' and the other half are pursuing non-punitive rehabilitative
treatment options."82 Indeed, "the law cannot claim to be fair
and just when the same defendant may serve 15 years in prison
or receive a short stay in a treatment program depending on the
policy preferences of the judge before whom he happens to
appear." 83
Furthermore, the need for guidance on sentencing policy is
heightened as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Booker
to render the Guidelines advisory. Cases like Kimbrough and
McBride demonstrate the district courts' wide latitude after
Booker to reject the Guidelines-in part or in whole-so long as
78. Rose Duffy, Student Author, The Return of Judicial Discretion, 45 Idaho L. Rev.
223, 246-47 (2008).
79. Student Author, Ninth Circuit Finds a Within-Guidelines Sentence for Illegal
Reentry to be Substantively Unreasonable: United States v. Amezcua-Vasquez, 123 Harv.
L. Rev. 2096, 2096 (2010).
80. Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing
Decisions, 60 Ala. L. Rev. 1, 27 (2008).
81. Id. at 28.
82. Lynch, supra n. 7, at 2.
8 3. Id.
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there is some basis in reason for the decision. After Booker,
district judges may consider a number of factors that were
prohibited under the mandatory Guidelines, including drug or
alcohol addiction, socioeconomic status, and factors like a lack
of appropriate adult supervision and family support during
childhood that suggest a disadvantaged upbringing. Yet
without guidance on how to apply these factors, and in
particular, how these factors relate to the purposes of
punishment, there is a danger that district courts will simply
choose not to exercise their discretion at all. Indeed, one
observer has pointed out that "[g]iven the potential for
confusion, it may prove easier to apply the guidelines in most
cases and then use boilerplate language to justify that
decision." 86
Another concern with the deference given to district judges
on issues of sentencing policy is the resulting uncertainty for the
defendant. As one commentator has noted, because defendants
do not know the policy preferences of the sentencing judge, their
ability to prepare an effective defense is undermined.
Theoretically, the Sentencing Commission has been
charged by statute with reviewing sentencing decisions and
shaping sentencing principles in response.88 Section 991(b)(1) of
Title 28 tasks the Sentencing Commission with establishing
"sentencing policies and practices" for the federal criminal
justice system that-(A) "assure the meeting of the [§ 3553(a)]
purposes of sentencing," (B) "provide certainty and fairness,"
and "avoid[] unwarranted sentencing disparities," and (C)
"reflect ... advancement in knowledge of human behavior." But
the Commission has been subject to significant criticism for its
failure to perform these roles. First, a number of scholars have
84. Rita, 551 U.S. at 364-65 (Stevens & Ginsburg,, JJ., concurring); William W. Berry
III, Mitigation in Federal Sentencing in the United States, in Mitigation and Aggravation at
Sentencing 247, 253-59 (Julian V. Roberts ed., Cambridge U. Press 2011).
85. Berry, supra n. 84, at 258-59 (discussing sentencing judges' reluctance to depart
from the Guidelines).
86. Id. at 259.
87. Student Author, Seventh Circuit Upholds Rejection of Diminished Capacity as
Mitigating Factor, United States v. Garthus, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1104, 1110 (2012) (citing
Apprendi).
88. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (1988) (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
89. See supra n. 4 (collecting authorities).
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argued that the Commission has rejected its statutory mandate to
"assure the meeting of the [§ 3553(a)] purposes of sentencing"
in developing the Guidelines.90 Under this mandate, the
Commission had an obligation "to build a system on a
foundation of purposes and to give guidance to judges as to how
purposes should be factored into determining sentences under
the guidelines." 91 Instead, the Commission chose an "empirical
approach" to sentence uniformity, determining the "average" of
prior sentences and setting numerical ranges of appropriate
sentences based on these averages. 92 And "[t]hough an empirical
analysis may provide a useful starting point, purposes are
needed to explain deviations from the empirically produced
sentences."93
Second, even if the Commission did undertake to review
sentencing decisions for application of sentencing principles, it
is unlikely that such decisions, as they are currently written, will
yield meaningful information about the sentencing purposes and
policies animating individual sentencing choices. Scholars have
observed that actual sentencing opinions often offer little more
than information about sentencing results.94 Despite Booker's
90. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A); see also Miller, supra n. 4, at 438-50; Berman, supra n.
4, at 100-02; William W. Berry III, Discretion Without Guidance: The Need to Give
Meaning to § 3553 after Booker and Its Progeny, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 631, 644 (2008).
91. Miller, supra n. 4, at 442 (citing Sen. Rpt. 98-225 at 75 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3183, 3258).
92. Id. at 438-43; but see Carissa Byrne Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing
Policy Decisions after Kimbrough, 93 Marq. L. Rev. 717, 728 (2009) (explaining that
"[t]he process that the Commission used to determine past practice has been the subject of
repeated methodological criticism," and arguing that, "[s]ince they were originally
promulgated, the Guidelines have drifted further away from their original empirical basis").
93. Miller, supra n. 4, at 443.
94. See Robert Weisberg, Guideline Sentencing, Traditional Defenses, and the
Evolution of Substantive Criminal Law Doctrine, 7 Fed. Senten. Rep. 168, 168 (1994)
(noting that sentencing decisions under the Guidelines have been composed of "more
complication of detail than richness of concept"); Berman, supra n. 4, at 106 & nn. 203-05
(citing the lack of meaningful discussion of sentencing purposes in sentencing decisions as
evidence that the judiciary has taken an "insignificant role in sentencing lawmaking under
the Guidelines"); Reitz, supra n. 9, at 1447-50 (discussing evolution of sentencing in
modem era), 1500 (noting that a "nagging concern for anyone who advocates high levels of
judicial creativity in sentence review is the very short list of inspiring opinions that have
ever been written in the field"); see also Micheal M. O'Hear, Appellate Review of Sentence
Explanations: Learning from the Wisconsin and Federal Experiences, 93 Marq. L. Rev.
751 (2009) (proposing a framework for reviewing the adequacy of sentence explanations
on appeal); Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 1,
65 (2010) (advocating for written explanation of sentencing decisions to create a
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mandate to consider the § 3553(a) factors independently,
sentencing decisions still contain little discussion of purposes of
punishment or penological philosophy. As one scholar observed
before Booker,
[e]ven though every sentencing case called for the
resolution of a range of issues that could be informed by
broad normative concepts, and even though the [Sentencing
Reform Act] instructs judges to consider the traditional
purposes of punishment when ascribing sentences, very
rarely did these concepts or purposes find expression in
sentencing opinions.
And, finally, even if sentencing courts undertook to provide
more information on sentencing purposes, it is doubtful that the
Commission, Congress, or the public as a practical matter would
be able to synthesize the substantive philosophies behind the
vast number of sentencing decisions that are issued in the federal
district courts.96 Robust appellate review of sentences, especially
review of the weight of the § 3553(a) factors, thus provides a
more transparent way to communicate judicial practices to the
Commission and the legislature.
C. Critiques ofRobust Appellate Review
There is a significant debate over how far federal appellate
courts should go in reviewing the substance of criminal
sentencing decisions. A wide body of scholarship opposes
robust appellate review of sentencing discretion, proposing
instead various tiered systems of appellate review that include
more deferential review for sentences within the Guidelines and
more robust review for sentences that significantly depart from
them. 97 Some have gone even further, seeking the elimination of
sentencing "jurisprudence," and noting that "careful statements of reasons are essential to
meaningful appellate review of sentencing decisions" after Booker (quotation omitted)).
95. Berman, supra n. 4, at 106.
96. See Ryan W. Scott, The Skeptic's Guide to Information Sharing at Sentencing,
2013 Utah L. Rev. - (forthcoming) (expressing doubt over whether lower court
decisions can contribute to a common law of sentencing due to practical limits on data-
sharing) (copy on file with author).
97. See e.g. D. Michael Fisher, Still in Balance? Federal District Court Discretion and
Appellate Review Six Years After Booker, 49 Duq. L. Rev. 641, 670-73 (2011); Jeffrey S.
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substantive reasonableness review almost entirely.98 Despite
disagreement on the details, these limited-review authors agree
on one thing: The courts of appeals should not substitute their
judgment for that of the district courts on how to weigh the
factors identified in § 3553(a).99
I have identified three primary bases for the hesitancy to
broaden the appellate role to include evaluation of sentencing
purposes. 00 I call these the functional, institutional, and
normative critiques of robust appellate review.
1. The Institutional Argument
The institutional critique, also called the you-are-there
rationale, is that district judges are the best actors to make
sentencing decisions due to their extensive experience with
sentencing and close contact with the evidence in the cases
Sutton, An Appellate Perspective on Federal Sentencing After Booker and Rita, 85 Denv.
U. L. Rev. 79, 85-91 (2007); Rust, supra n. 36, at 107-12.
98. See e.g. Harrison, supra n. 36, at 1154-58 (proposing that appellate review be
limited to review for illegality, irrationality, improper considerations, and failure to
consider a relevant factor); Cravens, supra n. 44, at 973-74 (advocating purely procedural
reasonableness review as the "the sole sensible bounds on the discretion of the district
judges in the sentencing context"); David C. Holman, Student Author, Death by A
Thousand Cases: After Booker, Rita, and Gall, the Guidelines Still Violate the Sixth
Amendment, 50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 267, 271 (2008) (arguing that appellate review
should be limited to procedural reasonableness, which the author refers to as "procedural
correctness"); see also Gall, 552 U.S. at 60 (Scalia, J., concurring) (reiterating the view
that "any appellate review of sentences for substantive reasonableness will necessarily
result in a sentencing scheme constitutionally indistinguishable from the mandatory
Guidelines struck down in United States v. Booker").
99. See e.g. Harrison, supra n. 36, at 1156 ("When a court of appeals begins
questioning how the district court weighs the statutory factors, it crosses the threshold of
necessary deference that the Supreme Court has articulated in Rita, Gall, and
Kimbrough.").
100. A fourth basis, Justice Scalia's constitutional concern, is not covered here.
According to Justice Scalia, every time an appellate court reverses a sentence as too high, it
establishes a fact that must be found in later cases to justify the higher sentence. Rita, 551
U.S. at 369 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and in the judgment). Thus, he says,
"some sentences reversed as excessive will be legally authorized in later cases only
because additional judge-found facts are present," and substantive review by judges is
unconstitutional under the Court's Apprendi jurisprudence. Id. at 369-70, 373. Because the
focus of this Article is whether a robust system of appellate review is workable, I leave
responding to Justice Scalia's argument for future discussion. In any event, the model
proposed here, which merely shifts sentencing discretion within the same institution, from
one judicial actor to another, does not threaten the jury's role in the way prohibited by the
Apprendi line of cases.
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before them.' 0' This argument is frequently cited by both
scholars and the Supreme Court to justify deferential appellate
review of sentencing decisions. 0 2
But recent research provides strong reasons to doubt
sentencing judges' dominance over all aspects of the choice of
sentence. Indeed, a summary of the psychological research on
cognition "casts much doubt on the familiar grounds given by
appellate courts for deference."103 The science shows, for
example, that "the appellate judge's reliance on a 'cold
transcript' may actually help by providing insulation from
misleading visual cues at the in-person sentencing hearing."104
This sort of evidence suggests at a minimum that "justification
for deference is not uniformly strong across the board."' 0 5
2. The Normative Argument
The second critique of robust appellate review, which I call
the "normative argument," is that deferential appellate review is
necessary in a guidelines regime to prevent over-enforcement of
guidelines and to allow trial courts to arrive at individualized
sentences. It is generally accepted that trial courts must be able
to pick a sentence that is appropriate for each individual
defendant, and to do this they need broad discretion at
sentencing.106 Scholars who subscribe to this view often point
out that when appellate courts have played a more robust role in
curbing sentencing discretion in guidelines regimes, it has led to
the opposite result: sentences that are overly harsh, anchored
inflexibly within the Guidelines, and inappropriate for particular
101. See Harrison, supra n. 36, at 1157-58 (citing Maurice Rosenberg, Appellate Review
of Trial Court Discretion, 79 F.R.D. 173, 182 (1978)).
102. See e.g. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109; Koon v. U.S., 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996); see
also Harrison, supra n. 36, at 1158 (citing Koon).
103. O'Hear, supra n. 10, at 2166.
104. Id. at 2127.
105. Id. at 2128; see also Frank 0. Bowman, III, Places in the Heartland: Departure
Jurisprudence After Koon, 9 Fed. Senten. Rep. 19, 20 (1996) (criticizing the Supreme
Court's assertion in Koon that district courts have an "institutional advantage" over
appellate courts in sentencing).
106. See e.g. Pepper v. US., U.S. ,. 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1239-40 (2011).
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individuals.' 07 Accordingly, to protect individualized sentences
and to avoid over-enforcement of the Guidelines, appellate
courts must remain mostly bystanders in the sentencing process,
limiting their role to review for procedural and legal errors and
policing only the most extreme variances from the Guidelines. 0 8
3. The Functional Argument
The final argument-the functional argument-maintains
that there is no principled way to implement substantive
reasonableness review without resorting to re-sentencing at the
appellate level. This argument is perhaps best articulated in the
assertion that "when judges try to find content for substantive
reasonableness analysis, they simply replace the sentencing
court's judgment with their own,"' 09 and the companion
recognition that "[i]f discretion is to have any robust meaning,
any integrity of meaning, in the sentencing context there can be
no such thing as substantive unreasonableness."' ?o Sentencing
observers thus do not see how appellate courts can question
procedurally proper sentences other than by applying a loose
standard like "unless the appellate court would have decided
otherwise.""' For these scholars, appellate review in sentencing
is essentially binary: Either we provide district courts with
discretion on all aspects of sentencing within procedural and
statutory bounds, or the appellate court acts as a second
sentencing court.
III. SENTENCE APPEALS IN ENGLAND
The following study of appellate review of sentences in
England gives us reasons to question all three of the usual
107. See e.g. Sutton, supra n. 97 at 79, 81-82 (describing the normative, or
"individualized sentencing" argument, and noting that there were few departures during the
mandatory-guidelines era "because guidelines-centric appellate review was rigorous").
108. Cf id. at 83-90 (proposing a "sliding-scale" appellate review, increasing the issues
to be reviewed on appeal as the sentence gets further from the advisory guidelines range),
89 (warning that such review "raises the specter of advancing consistency at the expense of
individualized sentencing" and could potentially "reinstate mandatory guidelines").
109. Cravens, supra n. 44, at 970.
110. Id. at966.
1L. Id- at 973.
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critiques-functional, normative, and institutional-against
robust appellate review. As will be demonstrated below, through
application of what I call a "mixed deference approach," the
Court of Appeal in England reviews sentencing decisions for
substantive reasonableness without unwarranted encroachment
of sentencing discretion and without over-enforcement of the
English Guidelines. Furthermore, by embracing its lawmaking
function, the English Court of Appeal works in tandem with the
institution that is tasked with developing guidelines-the
Sentencing Council for England and Wales-to provide
sentencing courts with benchmarks to guide the sentencing
decision, while at the same time allowing for the discretion
needed in the trial court to reach an individualized sentence.
A. Prior Comparative Work on Sentence Appeals
Before describing the modem sentencing model in
England, it is first helpful to summarize the prior comparative
work on robust appellate review that is the foundation for my
own research. Comparative work on criminal sentencing had its
heyday in the 1960s through 1980s when, as one contemporary
scholar put it, "Judicial reform [was] in the air."I 12 Prior to that
time, federal district courts were almost completely
unconstrained in their sentencing powers; appellate review was
limited to claims of legal error.
In the 1960s and 1970s, however, scholars began to lament
the disparate, biased, and discriminator sentences that marked
the criminal justice system at the time. These scholars called
for change, offering a diverse array of proposals designed to
control sentencing discretion and thereby inject uniformity and
112. Daniel J. Meador, Criminal Appeals: English Practices and American Reforms vii
(U. Press of Va. 1973).
113. See Rosenbaum, supra n. 2, at 875-99.
114. See Reitz, supra n. 9, at 1443-50 (detailing efforts to reform appellate review in the
1960s and 1970s and reasons for ultimate failure of such reform efforts). For leading
reformist arguments, see Marvin E. Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order (Hill
& Wang 1973); Daniel J. Meador, The Review of Criminal Sentences in England, in ABA
Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice-Standards Relating to Appellate
Review of Sentences 94 (Appendix C) (1st ed. ABA 1969).; Gerhard OW. Mueller & Fre
Le Poole, Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive Sentences: A Comparative Study, 21
Vand. L. Rev. 411 (1968); Stanley A. Weigel, Appellate Revision of Sentences: To Make
the Punishment Fit the Crime, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 405 (1968).
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fairness into criminal sentencing. One of the popular proposals
at the time was to broaden appellate review of criminal
sentences with the aim of developing a common law of criminal
sentencing principles." 5  These reformists believed that "a
regularized, rule-of-law approach to sentencing at the trial court
level would provide an intelligible basis for review on appeal,"
and that "appellate courts, habituated to the task of pronouncing
law for jurisdiction-wide application, would contribute
thoughtfully to the overall development of a consistent body of
sentencing jurisprudence." 1 1 6
However, robust review of criminal sentences was
practically unheard of at the time, at least in the federal courts of
appeals. Accordingly, scholars searched for outside
comparisons, hoping to provide models upon which to base a
successful and workable system of appellate review of criminal
sentences. It turned out that there were many such models, as
numerous foreign jurisdictions-and even a few state
jurisdictions-included some aspect of appellate review of
sentencing in their criminal justice systems. Studies of several
of these jurisdictions began to appear, examining a wide variety
of models of appellate review from throughout the world.
England provided a particularly valuable comparison because
robust appellate review of criminal sentences had been occurring
there for decades and thus had been thoroughly tested.
Scholarsl 9 presented detailed accounts of the English system of
appellate review of criminal sentences, providing evidence that
a court exercising appellate jurisdiction over sentences can
develop a meaningful case law of sentencing, provided that
it is prepared to take a sufficiently broad view of its
115. See Reitz, supra n. 9, at 1447-49.
116. Id. at 1448.
117. See generally Mueller & Le Poole, supra n. 114 (documenting numerous
examples).
118. See e.g. id.; D.A. Thomas, Appellate Review of Sentences and the Development of
Sentencing Policy: The English Experience, 20 Ala. L. Rev. 193 (1968) (evaluating
sentencing appeals in England); David J. Halperin, Sentence Reviews in Maine:
Comparisons and Comments, 18 Maine L. Rev. 133 (1966) (offering a comparison of
various state jurisdictions that offer appellate review of sentences, including Maine,
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Illinois); Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing
Decisions: A Connecticut Case Study, 69 Yale L.J. 1453 (1960) (evaluating the experience
of the Connecticut Sentence Review Division) [hereinafter "Case Study"].
119. See e.g. Meador, supra n. 114; Thomas, supra n. 118.
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function and discard the normal approach of an appellate
court in seeking only errors or abuses.120
These accounts showed that a common law of sentencing
through robust appellate review was a practical reality.
This comparative work also contributed to the wave of
overwhelming criticism against those United States jurisdictions
that had failed to adopt a system of appellate review of
sentences (which, incidentally, was almost all of them). As two
scholars studying appellate review of criminal sentences in
foreign jurisdictions lamented at the time, "[i]t can be
attributable only to chance or ignorance that the American
system, which permits no review of judicial choice in
sentencing, has not been declared unconstitutional."' 2'
As is well known, however, Congress did not choose
appellate review as its means of reforming federal sentencing.
Instead, it implemented the mandatory Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, choosing to opt for consistency in sentencing by
mandating specific sentencing outcomes instead of through
development of a common law of sentencing, or a consistent
sentencing approach. But this mandatory guidelines system
"failed to live up to the expectations of reformers,"l 22 at least in
part because "[r]ather than arriving at guidelines to implement
all of the purposes of the [Sentencing Reform Act], the
Commission emphasized one issue above all others, the problem
of sentencing disparity."123 So long as "one judge was doing the
same thing as another," it appeared to matter little which
principles their sentences furthered or whether their sentencing
choices were indeed correct.1 24
At this point, comparative work took a backseat, as courts
and observers spent the next twenty years attempting to grapple
with, make sense of, and criticize the new federal mandatory
sentencing regime. However, comparative study has enjoyed a
resurgence in recent years, as observers turn away from the
120. Thomas, supra n. 118, at 225.
121. Mueller & Le Poole, supra n. 114, at 413.
122. Gertner, supra n. 4, at 571.
123. Id. at 576 (emphasis original).
124. Id.
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federal guideline system.125  Indeed, some scholars have
questioned the modem dominance of the federal Guidelines-
both as a model for sentencing reform and as a focus of
academic research-and have suggested research into the
systems used by other jurisdictions to find alternative ways to
reform sentencing law and practice. 126
This prior comparative work provides several important
insights about appellate review of criminal sentences, two of
which are particularly relevant to this study. First, these studies
provide evidence to suggest that the creation of a common law
of sentencing through appellate review can have significant
benefits. These include, for example, relief from excessive
sentences,127 transparency of sentencing policies enabling
"informed public criticism" of the criminal process,128 and the
development of uniform policies of punishment in advance of
legislative guidance or expressions of public consensus in the
129area.
Despite this evidence of promise, these studies also
consistently show that appellate review must be designed
correctly in order to obtain most of these benefits. First,
appellate review must be guided by some standards or principles
to actually allow for development of uniform theories of
punishment. Studies of jurisdictions where the appellate courts
simply resentence the defendant without explanation show that
these courts do not contribute to the development of a common
125. Examples of more recent comparative studies of criminal sentence appeals include
Reitz, supra n. 9 (comparing the design of sentence appeals in Pennsylvania, Minnesota,
and the federal courts); Richard S. Frase, Comparative Perspectives on Sentencing Policy
and Research, in Sentencing and Sanctions in Western Countries 259, 272-75 (Michael H.
Tonry ed., Oxford U. Press 2001) (offering a review of sentencing issues on an
international scale, including sentence appeals and limits on sentencing discretion, and
suggesting further comparative research in this area); Burt W. Griffin & Lewis R. Katz,
Sentencing Consistency: Basic Principles Instead of Numerical Grids: The Ohio Plan, 53
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1 (2002); D.A. Thomas, The Role of the Court of Appeal in the
English Sentencing System, 10 Fed. Senten. Rep. 259 (1998) (examining the role of the
Court of Appeal in developing sentencing guidelines before the creation of the Sentencing
Council for England and Wales); and Susanne Di Pietro, The Development of Appellate
Sentence Review in Alaska, 75 Judicature 143 (Oct./Nov. 1991).
126. See e.g. Reitz, supra n. 9, at 1502.
127. Randall T. Shepard, Robust Appellate Review of Sentences: Just How British Is
Indiana? 93 Marq. L. Rev. 671, 680-811 (2009).
128. Case Study, supra n. 118, at 1476-77.
129. Thomas, supra n. 118, at 208.
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law of sentencing in a meaningful way. For example, a much-
cited 1968 case study of the Connecticut Sentence Review
Division concluded that its failure to articulate the specific
sentencing principles that formed the basis of its decisions led to
that court's failure to contribute to a "field of sentencing." 30
Although the Division had full power to review and revise
sentences, it usually merely substituted a different sentence on
appeal without linking the new sentence to specific sentencing
purposes.' 3 1 As a result, appellate review added little value other
than "as a res[t]raint on palpably unreasonable sentencing
decisions."' 32
A similar finding appears in a modem study of sentence
appeals in the military justice system, which, like the 1968
Connecticut model, includes de novo review of sentences on
appeal.133  But military appellate courts provide limited
information or justification for their decisions on whether a
sentence is appropriate, despite having a broad authority to
review sentencing decisions.134 Accordingly, appellate courts in
the military justice system act as a check only on a case-by-case
basis and do not establish a common law of sentencing
"appropriateness." 3 5
Studies like these tell us that, at the least, a sentencing
system must include an articulation of the aims of sentencing
that appellate courts can use to develop a sentencing
jurisprudence.1 As one commentator observed of Indiana's
130. Case Study, supra n. 118, at 1477.
131. Id. at 1476 (noting "the Division's reluctance to articulate sentencing policies").
132. Id.
133. Jeremy Stone Weber, Sentence Appropriateness Relief in the Courts of Criminal
Appeals, 66 A.F. L. Rev. 79, 89-90 (2010).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Mueller & Le Poole, supra n. 114, at 422-24 (calling on American jurisdictions to
develop a "statement of penal correctional aims" as a "necessary step toward developing a
sound sentencing and sentence review system"); Griffin & Katz, supra n. 125, at 4-18
(citing the legislature's development of sentencing principles, such as reasonableness,
proportionality, punishment, and public protection, as important to the success of the
advisory guidelines regime in Ohio); Kim S. Hunt & Michael Connelly, Advisory
Guidelines in the Post-Blakely Era, 17 Fed. Senten. Rep. 233, 238-39 (2005) (stating that
an advisory guidelines system can work only if its components include "goals for
sentencing clearly set by the sentencing commission and/or the state's highest court" and
"meaningful appellate review"); Andrew von Hirsch, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Do
They Provide Principled Guidance? 27 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 367, 388-89 (1989) (warning
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robust appellate review model, "the absence of any global
substantive framework ... makes it difficult for courts on appeal
to perceive when a given sentence deviates from the system-
wide norm."l 37 Accordingly, commentators have long advocated
for legislative and judicial articulation of a substantive
sentencing framework, including both general statements about
the "recognized aims of penal-correctional policy" and offense-
specific criteria "by which the perpetrator and his deed should
be evaluated."l 38
Furthermore, researchers in other jurisdictions have
observed that deference to trial courts on issues of sentencing
law and policy impedes the development of a common law of
sentencing. 139 These studies show that using standards like
"clear and convincing evidence" and "reasonable judge" prevent
appellate courts from providing meaningful guidance on the
meaning of principles of punishment.140 As a practical matter
this means that, to develop uniform criteria of sentencing,
appellate courts must review the application of sentencing
principles de novo. As one pre-guidelines study of English
appellate review put it, "[a] court which will intervene only
where there is an abuse of discretion by the trial judge
automatically limits its potential contribution to the widest
generalities, and probably to the context of procedure."141 To
"have sufficient scope to deal with the fundamental issues of
penal philosophy which are the basic problems of sentencing in
a modem system," a court of appeal "must be prepared to
discard [this] narrow approach . . . in favor of a broader
that, unless Canada implemented "explicitly stated norms or principles," appellate courts
were likely to reject a lawmaking role, as did the federal courts of appeals in the United
States).
137. Shepard, supra n. 127, at 681.
138. Mueller & Le Poole, supra n. 114, at 423.
139. Griffin & Katz, supra n. 125, at 67-68 (asserting that "[tihe trial judge's
determination of the law is not entitled to deference," and that "[i]ssues of law are matters
to be decided through the appellate process"); Case Study, supra n. 118, at 1466
(characterizing it as "extremely difficult if not impossible to deduce what aim or aims of
the criminal law are being emphasized" in the Division's decisions and similarly difficult
to "abstract any sentencing principles" from them).
140. Case Study, supra n. 118, at 1476 (noting that "a 'reasonable judge' test" provides
"little assistance to a trial judge seeking a positive statement of principles for future
application").
141. Thomas, supra n. 118, at 220.
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view."1 42 Furthermore, courts of appeals must affirmatively
articulate the sentencing policies that guide their decisions on
review in order for those policies to develop into a common law
of sentencing. 143 In sum, we have known for more than fifty
years that if appellate courts are not willing to "assume[] the role
of an affirmative policy-maker," there will be no "generally
applicable sentencing criteria" for the lower courts to apply. 144
These observations together provide some evidence of the
elements necessary to ensure successful implementation of
sentencing policy through robust appellate review. They are also
critical to consider as part of any modem effort to revise the
appellate function after Booker.
B. The Role of the Appellate Court in England
The modem appellate court plays a significant role in the
English criminal sentencing system, as it performs both broad
enforcement and lawmaking functions. Regarding enforcement,
the Court of Appeal in England is responsible for ensuring that
sentencing decisions comply with the law, including the
sentencing guidelines. In this way, the Court of Appeal's role is
similar to that of the enforcement role of federal appellate
courts-to ensure guidelines compliance. But the Court of
Appeal in England also performs a significant lawmaking
function that goes far beyond that of the federal courts of
appeals. From its creation in 1907 until the late 1990s, the Court
of Appeal in England shaped much of the law and policy of
sentencing through common law review of trial court sentencing
decisions. Although the Court of Appeal now shares its
lawmaking function with an independent sentencing
commission, called the Sentencing Council for England and
Wales (the "Sentencing Council"), the Court of Appeal has
nevertheless retained an important lawmaking role. In sharp
contrast to most appellate courts in the United States, the post-
guidelines English Court of Appeal has embraced the
opportunity to help shape sentencing law and policy by
142. Id.
143. Case Study, supra n. 118, at 1466, 1474-75.
144. Id. at 1477.
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continuing its common law review of sentencing policy, at the
same time as taking on the duty to enforce the guidelines.
1. The Basic Structure of Sentencing in England
The sentencing system in England is, in many ways,
strikingly similar to the post-Booker federal sentencing
system. Like the practice in the federal courts of appeals, the
English system is characterized by: (1) a legislature that sets
mandatory minimums and maximums and general sentencing
policies, (2) an independent sentencing body (the Sentencing
Council for England and Wales) that is responsible for
developing and issuing guidelines, and (3) an appellate court,
the Court of Appeal-Criminal Division, which reviews the
sentencing decisions of the trial courts.
Legislative guidance on sentencing policy is fairly limited,
and is roughly equivalent to the guidance provided by Congress
to the federal courts of appeals. As one commentator explains,
"[t]he role of legislation as a source of English sentencing law
has . . . largely been one of providing powers and setting outer
limits to their use."1 46 Just as Congress has authorized the
establishment of sentencing ranges for use in the federal courts,
Parliament has established sentencing ranges for each crime,
sometimes including mandatory minimums.147 It has also
enacted statutory provisions articulating principles of sentencing
meant to provide general guidance to the courts in making
sentencing decisions.148 For example, § 152(2) of the Criminal
Justice Act of 2003 provides that
[t]he court must not pass a custodial sentence unless it is of
145. Readers interested in both the English sentencing system generally and the history
and modem practice of appellate review in England might consult Sentencing Guidelines,
Exploring the English Model (Andrew Ashworth & Julian V. Roberts eds. Oxford U. Press
2013); Archbold: Criminal Pleading, Evidence, and Practice 2013 (James Richardson ed.,
61st ed., Sweet & Maxwell 2012); John Sprack, A Practical Approach to Criminal
Procedure (14th ed., Oxford U. Press 2012); Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal
Justice (5th ed., Cambridge U. Press 2010); Thomas, supra n. 125; D.A. Thomas,
Principles of Sentencing (2d ed., Ashgate Publg. Co. 1979); D.A. Thomas, Principles of
Sentencing (1st ed., Heinemann Educ. Books 1970); Meador, supra n. 114; and Thomas,
supra n. 118.
146. Ashworth, supra n. 145, at 25.
147. See generally id. at 24-27.
148. Id.
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the opinion that the offence, or the combination of the
offence and one or more offences associated with it, was so
serious that neither a fine alone nor a community sentence
can be justified for the offence. 149
And Parliament has also provided that, where a custodial
sentence is imposed, it must be "for the shortest term . .. that in
the opinion of the court is commensurate with the seriousness of
the offence."'5 0 Through provisions like these, Parliament has
established a general policy in favor of non-prison alternatives,
parsimony, and proportionality.'51
Parliament has also articulated five "purposes of
sentencing" that a sentencing court must consider in imposing
sentence. 2 These are "the punishment of offenders, . . . the
reduction of crime (including its reduction by deterrence), . . .
the reform and rehabilitation of offenders, . . . the protection of
the public, . . . and the making of reparation by offenders to
persons affected by their offences." 53 But like Congress in the
United States, Parliament has historically delegated the task of
developing further sentencing policy to other institutions, first to
the Court of Appeal and later to both the Court of Appeal and
the Sentencing Council. I describe these two institutions next.
A single court hears all appeals of criminal sentences in
England and Wales: the Court of Appeal-Criminal Division (the
"Court of Appeal," the "Court," or the "Criminal Division"). 154
149. Criminal Justice Act, (2003) § 152(2) (available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2003/44/contents). In response to this provision, the Court of Appeal has created the
"custodial threshold," which requires a court to determine whether prison is necessary
before evaluating the appropriate length of any sentence. R. v. Seed & Stark, [2007] EWCA
(Crim) 254, [439]; [2007] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 69 (pointing out that if the custodial threshold
has not been passed, "no custodial sentence can be imposed").
150. Criminal Justice Act, (2003) § 153.
151. See Seed & Stark, [2007] EWCA (Crin) 254 [439-40] (noting the provisions in the
2003 Act that favor non-prison alternatives and address the need for parsimony in
punishment).
152. Criminal Justice Act, (2003) § 142(1).
153. Id. Those familiar with federal sentencing will recognize these principles as similar
to the sentencing purposes used in the United States-just punishment, deterrence,
protection of the public, and rehabilitation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
154. Originally, the Court of Appeal-Criminal Division was known as the Court of
Criminal Appeal. Sprack, supra n. 145, at 470. Its name and makeup have changed in a
number of ways, for reasons irrelevant to this article. See id. at 470-71 (discussing the
evolution of the English criminal sentence appeal tribunal). To avoid confusion, I will
consistently refer to the Court of Appeal-Criminal Division as the "Court of Appeal," the
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Hearing appeals of convictions and sentences is the Court of
Appeal's only work.15 5 Although the Court of Appeal is a single
court, it is in fact made up of different panels of at least three
Lord Justices of Appeal, pulled from the thirty-seven Justices
who sit on the wider Court of Appeal.156 In addition, various
other judges (such as judges of the lower trial courts, known as
crown courts) may be asked to sit on Criminal Division
appeals.' 5 7 The Lord Chief Justice is president of the Criminal
Division, and often issues some of its more important decisions
as a way of giving them greater authority.'5
Another difference between the English appellate system
and practice in the federal courts of appeals is the scope of
evidence heard on appeal: The Court of A peal is not limited to
the evidence introduced in the trial court. 9 The appellant can
request, and the Court of Appeal can order, that additional
evidence or witnesses be presented at the hearing.16 0 As one
observer has noted, appellate review in England is designed to
"determine whether at the time the case is before the [Court of
Appeal], and on the information then available, the sentence
should be affirmed or altered." 6 1 To achieve this purpose of
determining the appropriate sentence at the time of the appeal, it
may be seen as necessary that the Court of Appeal be able to
hear all evidence relevant to that determination.162  This
approach to the appellate function is in sharp contrast to the
approach in most United States jurisdictions, where the review is
usually to determine whether the trial judge erred in some way
on the information then before her. As the analysis below shows,
this difference casts doubt on the ability to transfer one aspect of
the English Court of Appeal's review of sentences, namely the
"Court," or the "Criminal Division," regardless of the tribunal's name when the action
discussed took place.
155. Sprack, supra n. 145, at 470-71.
156. Id. at 471 (also noting, however, that "[a]ppeals against sentence may be
determined by a two judge court").
157. Id. at 471-72.
158. Id. at 471; Ashworth, supra n. 145, at 36 (noting that "[t]hese judgments acquired
authority from the fact that the Lord Chief Justice laid them down").
159. Sprack, supra n. 145, at 491-93.
160. Id.
161. Meador, supra n. 114, at 139.
162. Id. at 116 (noting that "the Court is not limited to the trial record").
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ability to modify sentences on appeal, to the federal courts of
appeals.
Prior to creation of the Court of Appeal-Criminal Division
by the Court of Appeal Act of 1907, there was no right to
appellate review of criminal sentences. 6 3 As one commentator
has explained, the Court of Appeal was established to address
the concern that judges were sentencing defendants according to
wildly diverse sentencing philosophies. 164 In one court, a judge
might be emphasizing the cumulative principle, under which a
defendant's sentence increases as his criminal history increases,
while in another the judge might be sentencing according to a
proportionality philosophy.16  "The solution which was
eventually adopted" to address this disparity "was the
introduction of appellate review,"166 so that the set of uniform
sentencing principles established by the new court would
introduce uniformity into the sentencing process.167
The jurisdiction and function of the Court of Appeal have
changed little since its creation in 1907. The Court of Appeal
hears appeals of cases from the crown courts,16 8 which preside
over jury trials involving the more serious crimes, such as
murder, manslaughter, robbery, and rape.'69 The Court of
Appeal has broad jurisdiction over sentence appeals. Under
section 11(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act of 1968, the Criminal
Division may hear an appeal "if they consider that the Appellant
should be sentenced differently for an offence for which he was
163. Sprack, supra n. 145, at 470.




168. Defendants in England and Wales are sentenced in one of two courts, the crown
courts or the magistrates' courts. The magistrates' courts deal with the bulk of the criminal
trials in England, hearing cases involving the least serious criminal offenses, such as minor
thefts and driving infractions. Magistrates may sentence criminal offenders only to a
maximum of six months imprisonment per charge, or a total of twelve months for all
charges. Although these courts handle the bulk of the criminal cases, the Court of Appeal
has little to no interaction with them because defendants sentenced in magistrate courts
appeal their sentences to the crown courts. On appeal, the crown court reviews sentences
de novo, and may order any sentence that appears just. Commentators see the crown
courts' appellate role as mostly a guard against excessive sentences. For all practical
purposes, crown court sentencing decisions are final. See generally D.A. Thomas,
Sentencing in England, 42 Md. L. Rev. 90, 91-94 (1983); Ashworth, supra n. 145, at 1-6.
169. Sprack, supra n. 145, at 9-10.
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dealt with by the court below."o Additionally, on appeal,
Criminal Division panels may vary the sentences imposed and
substitute their own sentences "as they think appropriate for the
case."' 7 ' The only legislative restriction on this power is that, on
appeal by the defendant, the Court of Appeal may not impose a
sentence that is higher than the sentence originally imposed at
trial.172 However, the Court of Appeal can increase a sentence
on appeal by the Government.'"
The Court of Appeal has not chosen to exercise the full
extent of its jurisdiction in the context of sentence review.
Instead, over time, it has developed its own standards of review,
stating that it will not reverse a sentence unless it is "wrong in
principle" or "manifestly excessive."l 74 In practical terms, these
standards of review lead to three different types of sentencing
decisions in England: (1) guidelines judgments, (2) excessive
sentence modifications, and (3) policy guidance. Each is
described in the following sections.
The Court of Appeal fulfilled its legislative purpose of
establishing uniformity of sentencing principles and responding
to perceived disparity of sentencing by developing both common
law sentencing principles, and, starting in the 1970s, sentencing
guidelines. 7 5 As one sentencing scholar has explained, "[t]his
area of judge-made law was a commendable attempt to impose a
greater degree of consistency upon an area of law where
traditionally there had been wide discretion and divergence of
approach."
170. Criminal Appeal Act, (1968) § 11(3) (available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/1968/19/contents).
171. Id.
172. Id § 4(3); see also Thomas, supra n. 125, at 260; cf Criminal Appeal Act (1968)
§ 11(3) (providing that "the Court shall so exercise their powers under this subsection that,
taking the case as a whole, the appellant is not more severely dealt with on appeal than he
was dealt with by the court below").
173. Criminal Justice Act, (1988) § 36 (available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga
/1988/33/contents). These government appeals are referred to as "Attorney General's
References." Thomas, supra n. 125, at 260.
174. Thomas, supra n. 125, at 260.
175. See id. at 259-62 (discussing history of policy guidance and guidelines judgments
in the Court of Appeal).
176. Martin Wasik, The Status and Authority of Sentencing Guidelines, 39 Bracton L.J.
9, 11 (2007).
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However, the appellate review system had its problems too.
By the 1980s, it became clear that the appellate model for
creation of sentencing law and policy had some "inherent
,,177disadvantages. Most importantly, the appellate process,
which addresses issues on a case-by-case basis, made it difficult
to develop "general principles, or aggravating or mitigating
factors which might cut across a range of offenses." 7 ' As two
observers pointed out at the time, "[i]t has been clear for some
years that English sentencing law lacks any coherent
rationale." 79
To address this problem, in 1998, Parliament established
the precursor to the current Sentencing Council, the Sentencing
Advisory Panel ("SAP"). As originally conceived, the SAP was
something in the nature of a think tank. That is, it was a body of
individuals recruited from across the world of criminal
sentencing-judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
academics-who would research sentencing issues and policies
and provide advice and guidance to the Court of Appeal in
deciding cases before it. Importantly, the Court of Appeal
remained the sole body responsible for issuing, developing, and
revising sentencing guidelines. After 1998, though, the SAP
advised the Court in this task.1 so
Fairly quickly, however, there was a push to provide the
SAP with lawmaking powers, particularly to allow for the
development of general guidelines without having to wait for a
related appeal, as the Court of Appeal is obliged to do.' 8' In
response, in 2003, Parliament created the Sentencing Guidelines
Council ("SGC"), which now had the power to "create
guidelines across a wide range of issues that are relevant to
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Martin Wasik & Andrew von Hirsch, Statutory Sentencing Principles: The 1990
White Paper, 53 Modem L.R. 508, 508 (1990).
180. For further information on the creation of the SAP and its evolution into the
Sentencing Council, see Andrew Ashworth & Julian V. Roberts, The Origins and Nature of
the Sentencing Guidelines in England and Wales, in Sentencing Guidelines, Exploring the
English Model 1, 3-5 (Andrew Ashworth & Julian V. Roberts eds. Oxford U. Press 2013).
181. See id. at 4-5 (discussing the 2001 Home Office Sentencing Review and its critique
of the Court of Appeal's involvement in implementing sentencing guidelines).
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sentencing."182 The SAP remained in existence after the 2003
Act, studying sentencing policy and providing advice to the
SGC, not the Court of Appeal. In 2009, Parliament essentially
combined the functions of the SGC and the SAP into one body,
the Sentencing Council for England and Wales (the "Sentencing
Council"), which exists today. 83 Sentencing guidelines issued
either by SGC before 2003 or the Sentencing Council after 2003
are called "Definitive Sentencing Guidelines."l 84
Finally, unlike the United States Sentencing Commission,
the Sentencing Council does not have exclusive jurisdiction to
develop sentencing guidelines and policy guidance. Parliament
has re-affirmed the Court of Appeal's lawmaking power,
specifying that the creation of the Sentencing Council did not
abrogate the power of the Court of Appeal to "provide guidance
relatin to the sentencing of offenders in a judgment of the
court. " The Court of Appeal thus continues to enforce,
review, and revise its old sentencing guidelines and develop new
guidelines as needed. It also issues decisions interpreting the
Sentencing Council's Definitive Guidelines, both broadly and as
applied in specific cases. Finally, as always, the Court of Appeal
provides guidance on general sentencing principles.
The result is that, in the English system, the Sentencing
Council and the Court of Appeal work in tandem to develop and
182. Criminal Justice Act, (2003) explanatory n. at 56, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2003/44/pdfs/ukpgaen_20030044_en.pdf (accessed Oct. 21, 2013; copy on file with
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
183. Coroners and Justice Act, (2009) §§ 118-124, 135 (available at http://www
.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/25/contents); see also Ashworth & Roberts, supra n. 180, at
3-5 (discussing legislative and historical origins of the Sentencing Council).
184. A brief historical aside will be interesting to those familiar with the history of
sentencing in the federal courts of the United States. Around 2007, the Sentencing Council
in England briefly considered whether the Definitive Guidelines should be made
mandatory and whether the country should switch to a grid-based guideline system, such as
exists in many U.S. jurisdictions. The Council ultimately rejected such a model after
receiving overwhelming criticism. See e.g. Julian V. Roberts, Sentencing Guidelines and
Judicial Discretion: Evolution of the Duty of Courts to Comply in England and Wales, 51
Brit. J. Criminology 997 (2011); Sentencing Commission Working Group, Sentencing
Guidelines in England and Wales: An Evolutionary Approach, 12-14 (July 2008).
185. Coroners and Justice Act, (2009) § 124(8) (available at http://www.legislation.gov
.uk/ukpga/2009/25/contents); see also R v. Blackshaw, [2011] EWCA (Crim) 2312, [1133],
[2012] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 114 ("[N]othing in the 2009 Act has diminished the jurisdiction
of this court, where necessary, to promulgate judgments relating to the principles and
approach to be taken to sentencing decisions.").
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issue sentencing policy. As the Court of Appeal has itself said,
"[t]he relationship between this court and the Sentencing
Council proceeds on the basis of mutual respect and comity."'
For example, when issuing a new Definitive Guideline on an
issue where the Court of Appeal has already ruled, the Council
has gone out of its way to acknowledge, stud and respond to
the Court of Appeal's reasoning on the issue. Conversely, the
Court of Appeal usually defers to the Council's judgments on
guideline issues and deviates from Definitive Guidelines when
compelled to by new facts, new law, or some indication of error
in application of established sentencing principles.'8 8
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal acknowledges the Council's
contemplation of guidelines in particular instances and is careful
to note the temporary nature of its own guidelines in the
meantime.189 This kind of respectful acknowledgment of the
other's expertise and judgment by each institution is necessary
to avoid the confusion that would inevitably result from
conflicting guidance on the same issue.190
On the other hand, it appears just as important that these
two institutions do not each completely delegate the role of
developing sentencing policy to the other. Both institutions
develop sentencing policy, the Court of Appeal through review
of the cases that come before it, and the Sentencing Council
186. R v. Blackshaw, [2011] EWCA (Crim) 2312, [1133], [2012] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 114.
187. Burglary Offences Guideline: Professional Consultation (2010), http://sentencing
council.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/Burglary-offences-guideline--_professional_consultation.pdf
(May 2011) (discussing Court of Appeal's burglary guidelines in outlining proposed
Definitive Guidelines for public comment) (accessed Sept. 23, 2013; copy on file with
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
188. See Andrew Ashworth, The Struggle for Supremacy in Sentencing, in Ashworth &
Roberts, supra n. 180, 15, 16-19, 25-27. For more on the relationship between the Court of
Appeal and the Sentencing Council, see id.; Julian V. Roberts, Sentencing Guidelines in
England and Wales: Recent Developments and Emerging Issues, 76 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 1, 14-22 (2013).
189. See Ashworth, supra n. 188, at 22-23; see e.g. R. v. Corran, [2005] [2005] EWCA
(Crim) 192; 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 73 (providing "preliminary" guidelines on sentencing the
new offences created by the Sexual Offences Act 2003); R v. Richardson, [2006] EWCA
(Crim) 3186; [2007] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 36 (issuing new guidelines in death-by-dangerous-
driving cases, but acknowledging that the SAP had started working on guidelines and thus
"further guidance from the Sentencing Guidelines Council" might be forthcoming).
190. But see Ashworth, supra n. 188, at 24 (attributing the lack of public differences of
opinion between the Sentence Council and the Court of Appeal in part to the presence of
members of the Court of Appeal on the Council).
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through study and consultation. The Court of Appeal has been
quite careful to retain its power to review sentences for incorrect
sentencing principles, regardless of whether the error occurs
because of the independent judgment of the sentencing court or
the application of the Council's Definitive Guidelines. Indeed,
the success of the system appears to lie just as much in the
willingness of the actors to question each other as in the respect
they provide.
2. Guidelines and Excessive-Sentence Review
With regard to the guidelines, the Court of Appeal
exercises its lawmaking role when it issues guidelines or makes
changes to existing guidelines, while its enforcement role
involves both procedural review-to ensure that the guidelines
are properly applied and proper procedures followed-and
substantive excessive-sentence review. Although these functions
have separate purposes, they are often linked because the Court
often uses its excessive-sentence review to enforce both its own
guidelines and the Definitive Guidelines of the Council.
Since 2003, the primary institution responsible for
developing and issuing guidelines has been either the Sentencing
Council or its precursor, the SGC. However, sentencing
guidelines have existed in England since the 1970s, when the
Court of Appeal began to issue guidelines, in the form of
"guideline judgments."191 It did so "as a means of providing
assistance to Crown Court sentencers in the disposal of
particular types of offence, mainly the most serious forms of
crime which attract long prison sentences."l92 Most guidelines
judgments issued by the Court of Appeal are "based on the
existing practice of the Court of Appeal and are intended to
provide a convenient restatement of . . . practice."' 9 3 These
judgments often summarize past precedent to provide more
accessible and "general guidance on how a particular type of
crime should be dealt with." 94 Some guidelines judgments go
191. Thomas, supra n. 125, at 261-62.
192. Martin Wasik, Sentencing Guidelines in England and Wales-State of the Art? 4
Crim. L. Rev. 253, 253 (2008).
193. Thomas, supra n. 125, at 261.
194. Id.
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further, though, and are "intended to signal a change of the
practice of the Court of A eal," often "in light of changes in
the law or public attitudes."
English scholars appear to accept that, "in strict terms," the
Court of Appeal's guideline judgments are "massive obiter
dicta, since much of what is said is not essential to the decision
in the particular case."' 96 But it is also quite clear that this does
not lessen their binding nature. English observers agree that the
mere fact that these judgments are issued by the Lord Chief
Justice provides them with an air of authority.' 97 Furthermore,
"[t]hese judgments ... were intended to bind lower courts, and
were treated as doing so."' 98
Regardless of the institution generating them-the Court of
Appeal or the Sentencing Council-guidelines in England take a
similar tariff-type format.' 99 They usually identify degrees of
harm and/or culpability for specific crimes, correlate these with
sentencing ranges and starting points, and provide examples of
mitigating and aggravating factors that suggest when a
sentencing court should impose a sentence either below or above
the starting point.200 As an example, a person convicted of
aggravated burglary in England is subject to a maximum
sentence of life in prison. 20 1 The Definitive Guideline indicates
an "offence range" for aggravated burglary of from one to
195. Id.
196. Ashworth, supra n. 145, at 36.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. The description that follows represents the primary guidelines model used by the
Sentencing Council since the passage of the Coroners and Justice Act of 2009. Roberts,
supra n. 188, at 4-11. Note, though, that although Guidelines in England all follow the
same basic tariff-type structure, they are not in fact identical. Compare e.g. Sentencing
Guidelines Council, Burglary Offences: Definitive Guidelines (2011), http://sentencingcoun
cil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/Burglary DefinitiveGuidelineweb_fmal.pdf (accessed Sept. 24,
2013; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process) [hereinafter "Aggravated
Burglary Guidelines"], with e.g. Sentencing Council, Drug Offences: Definitive Guideline
(2012), http://sentencingcounciljudiciary.gov.uk/docs/DrugOffencesDefinitive-Guideline
final_(web).pdf. (accessed Oct. 21, 2013; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice
and Process).
200. Ashworth, supra n. 145, at 27-34.
201. Theft Act, (1968) § 10 (defining crime as including burglary committed while in
possession of "any firearm or imitation firearm, any weapon of offence, or any explosive")
(available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/60/contents).
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202thirteen years. This means that it will usually be appropriate
to sentence an offender convicted of aggravated burglary to a
term of between one and thirteen years.
The Definitive Guideline then breaks up the offense of
aggravated burglary into three specific categories based on
application of various exhaustive factors relating to level of
harm and culpability, such as whether the victim was on the
premises at the time of the burglary and whether violence was
used or threatened. Each category has its own "category range,"
the lowest being one-to-four years and the highest nine-to-
thirteen years. The Guideline also sets a "starting point" for each
of these categories, the lowest category having a starting point
of two years, and the highest of ten years. Once the category
range and starting point are determined, the Guideline then lists
various aggravating and mitigating factors that suggest a
sentence higher or lower than the starting point. Examples for
aggravated burglary include "Gratuitous degradation of victim"
and "Good character and/or exemplary conduct." 204 These
factors are non-exhaustive, and crown courts have wide latitude
in identifying other factors that, in their judgment, affect the
appropriate sentence in each case.2 05
The English sentencing guidelines cannot be called
mandatory, presumptive, or advisory as those terms are usually
understood in the United States. The English guidelines are, in
fact, something in between. Sentencing courts in England have a
statutory duty to consult the guidelines and to "decide which of
the categories most resembles" the defendant in a particular
case.206 Furthermore, sentencing courts in England "must ...
follow" the guidelines "unless the court is satisfied that it would
be contrary to the interests of justice to do so." 207 If a court does
not "follow" the guidelines, it must provide a statement of
208reasons explaining its decision. However, this duty to
202. Aggravated Burglary Guidelines, supra n. 199.
203. Coroners and Justice Act, (2009) § 125(3).
204. Aggravated Burglary Guidelines, supra n. 199, at 5.
205. Roberts, supra n. 188, at 8 n. 31 (citing Ashworth, supra n. 145). Readers interested
in a more detailed description of the format of the Guidelines in England might review this
article in its entirety.
206. Coroners and Justice Act, (2009) § 125(3)(b).
207. Id. § 125(1).
208. Criminal Justice Act, (2003) § 174(2)(aa).
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"follow" the guidelines extends only to imposing a sentence
within the entire offense range, not to imposing a sentence
within the category range. Using the aggravated burglary
example above, the court's duty to follow the aggravated
burglary guideline means only that the court must sentence
within the one-to-thirteen year offense range. The court does not
have a separate duty to impose a sentence within the category
range; it need only determine the correct category range and
starting point and take them into account.
Ultimately, what this means for comparative purposes is
that the English guidelines appear to be, in effect, a bit more
binding than the post-Booker advisory federal Guidelines, but
not by much. Two primary factors support this conclusion. First,
offense ranges in England are quite wide-certainly far wider
than the grid-based guidelines that are a mark of the guidelines
regimes in the United States. Compare, for example, the twelve-
year offense range for aggravated burglary in England, with the
seven-month Guidelines range for a similar offense in federal
court in the United States. 210 Accordingly, even with the duty to
follow the offense range in England, there is nevertheless
significant room for discretion on the part of the sentencing
courts.211
209. Coroners and Justice Act, (2009) § 125(3) ("[N]othing in this section imposes on
the court a separate duty .. . to impose a sentence which is within the category range.");
see also Roberts, supra n. 184, at 1010 n. 20 (citing Andrew Ashworth, Coroners and
Justice Act 2009: Sentencing Guidelines and the Sentencing Council, 5 Crim. L. Rev. 389,
395 (2010) [hereinafter "Ashworth, Coroners and Justice Act"]); Andrew Ashworth,
Departures from the Sentencing Guidelines, 2012 Crim. L. Rev. 81, 81-83 [hereinafter
"Ashworth, Departures"]; Roberts, supra n. 188, at 13.
210. Compare Aggravated Burglary Guidelines, supra n. 199 (suggesting sentence of
between one and thirteen years), with United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines
Manual § 2B2.1 (2012) (applying an offense level of nineteen, which yields a sentence of
thirty to thirty-seven months, for a defendant graded into the lowest criminal-history
category after being convicted of burglary of a residence with a firearm).
211. Roberts, supra n. 188, at 13; but see Kevin R. Reitz; Comparing Sentencing
Guidelines, in Sentencing Guidelines: Exploring the English Model 182, 195 (Andrew
Ashworth & Julian V. Roberts eds. Oxford U. Press 2013) (describing critique of the
Coroners and Justice Act of 2009 for its failure to promote consistent sentencing by
making "departures formally impossible within the offense range"); Ashworth, Coroners
and Justice Act, supra n. 209, at 395-96 (calling the compliance requirement in the 2009
statute "pitifully loose" and arguing that the wide latitude provided to sentencing judges
"substantially weakens any objective of increasing transparency and consistency of
approach").
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Furthermore, sentencing guidelines in England are
characterized by a high level of flexibly, to a degree that is
generally unknown in the United States. There is an often-
quoted phrase used in England that "sentencing guidelines are
guidelines not tramlines." 12 The Court of Appeal reaffirmed
this principle when it held that the statutory provision declaring
that sentencing courts "must follow" the sentencing guidelines
"does not require slavish adherence to them." 213 As the Court
explained, not only do sentencing courts have "latitude" to
sentence anywhere in the wider offense range, but the statute
allows departure from the offense range where "the court is
satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do
so."214 This approach is designed to promote "consistency of
approach to sentencing decisions up and down the country
without sacrificing the obligation to do justice in the individual
and specific case."215
To further explain how guidelines work in England, and
how the Court of Appeal enforces them, an example is helpful.
In R. v. Xiong Xu, the Court of Appeal issued a guidelines
judgment regarding large-scale cultivation and production of
cannabis. At the time, neither the Council nor the Court of
Appeal had set out guidelines for this offense. In Xiong Xu, the
Court stated its intent to "indicate the bracket" appropriate for
different categories of the offense in order to achieve "some
consistency of sentencing." 217 To do this, the Court granted
seven defendants-who together represented a wide scale of
212. See e.g. R. v. Blackshaw, [2011] EWCA (Crim) 2312, [1133], [2012] 1 Cr. App. R.
(S.) 114.
213. Id. (quoting Coroners and Justice Act, (2009) § 125(1)(a)).
214. Id. (citing Coroners and Justice Act, (2009) § 125(1), (3)-(4)).
215. Id.; but see Ashworth, Departures, supra n. 209, at 93-96 (suggesting that "it
would be good practice for courts to give reasons where they adopt a starting point that lies
outside the offence-range, even if they subsequently (e.g. by making a reduction for a
guilty plea) impose a sentence that comes within the offence-range").
216. [2007] EWCA (Crim) 3129, [2008] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 50. In 2012, the Sentencing
Council issued a Definitive Guideline on cultivation of cannabis that overtakes Xiong Xu.
See Sentencing Council, Drug Offenses, Definitive Guideline, http://sentencing
counciljudiciary.gov.uk/docs/DrugOffencesDefinitiveGuidelineifinal_(web).pdf (2012)
(accessed Sept. 24, 2013; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
217. Xiong Xu, [2007] EWCA (Crim) 3129, [311].
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involvement in the production process-leave to appeal.2 18 All
had been sentenced to four to five years' imprisonment. 2 19 On
review, the Court of Appeal described the typical operation
involved in the cultivation and production of cannabis, from the
use of low-paid workers for labor, to the managers who arrange
for delivery and distribution of plants, to the operators who
obtain the premises and receive the profits.220 The Court then
explained that the problem of cannabis production had become
more pronounced, characterized by very high profits, extremely
strong drugs, and large-scale operations, and that deterrent
sentences are normally required in this context because the
operations are extremely profitable, with minimal costs. 222
However, the Court cautioned that deterrent sentences are not
necessary for "those at the bottom end of the hierarchy,"
explaining that "discovery and the threat of deportation" are
"probably the most pressing concerns" for low-level workers
who are typically "paid either nothing, but provided with board
and lodging, or paid simply enough for subsistence." 223
With these facts in mind, and considering the maximum
sentence of fourteen years, the Court described three different
categories of offenses. First, for "those involved at the lowest
level," the Court set the starting point at three years.224 The
starting point for managers, was set at "somewhere between
three and seven years depending on the level of their
involvement and the value of the cannabis being produced." 2 25
Finally, for the organizers who "set up and control individual
operations," the Court set a starting point of "six to seven years
depending upon the quantity of cannabis involved." 226
The Court then reviewed the sentences of the individual
defendants, determining that the sentencing judges used the
wrong category ranges for the three defendants who were lower-
218. Id. at 311-17 (indicating that appellants ranged from lower-level gardeners to those
operating and profiting from the business).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 310-11.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 310.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 310-11.
225. Id. at 311.
226. Id.
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level workers and who had little to no involvement in the
management of the business.227 To determine how much to
reduce these sentences, the Court carefully reviewed the facts of
the case, identified any mitigating or aggravating circumstances,
and set the sentence that, in the Court's own judgment, was
228
appropriate. The Court reduced the sentences of two
defendants who did little more than "tend the plants" and of one
defendant who had very minor management duties. 229
Conversely, the Court upheld the sentences of several
defendants who were all higher-level managers or operators of
the cannabis operations.23 The Court explained that these
sentences were within the correct guidelines range.231 Xiong Xu
thus perfectly exemplifies the basic two-level structure of
appellate review in England as it relates to the guidelines: (1)
review only for error in principle if a sentence is within the
guidelines offense range, and (2) de novo review both of the
ultimate sentence choice and for error in principle if the sentence
is outside the guidelines range.
If a sentence falls within the relevant guideline range, the
Court of Appeal usually says that it will not interfere with the
judgment of the court below unless there is some error that
amounts to a "wrong in principle."23 2 This practice is sometimes
referred to as the "no tinker" rule.233 So, for example, the Court
in Xiong Xu affirmed the five-and-a-half year sentence of a
manager, even though the Court remarked that it was
"undoubtedly at the top end of the appropriate bracket." 234
Importantly, the Court still reviewed the manager's sentence for




230. Id. at 313-17 (discussing appellants Nguyen Van Minh, Dai Van Mguyen, Ha Thi
Pham, and Vinh Van Hoang).
231. Id.
232. Thomas, supra n. 125, at 261; see also Sprack, supra n. 145, at 483.
233. Meador, supra n. 114, at 125, 129.
234. R v. Xiong Xu, [2007] EWCA (Crim) 3129, [314], [2008] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 50; see
also R v. Bowyer, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1112, [2010] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 22 (refusing an
application to appeal a sentence of six-and-a-half years imprisonment for causing death by
dangerous driving-at the very top of the correctly identified guidelines range-despite the
fact that, in the Court's opinion, the proper sentence should have been closer to the bottom
of the guidelines range, or four years).
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error in principle, seeking to determine if the facts that the
sentencing court relied on could reasonably support the sentence
imposed. However, the Court of Appeal did not substitute its
own judgment on what the sentence should have been. If,
conversely, a sentence is "outside the range or bracket of
sentences which would be permissible for that offence in the
circumstances in which it was committed," then the Court will
review the sentence closely and substitute its own sentence as it
thinks appropriate. 236 This review, which I call "excessive
sentence modification," is what the Court did for the lower level
workers in Xiong Xu.
In short, the guidelines affect the level of scrutiny with
which the Court of Appeal will review a sentence. That is, the
Court says it will not disturb a sentence within the guidelines
unless there is some error in principle, while it will conduct de
novo review of sentence length-thus in essence resentencing
the defendant-if the sentence is outside the guidelines offense
range.
Finally, it is important to point out that the Xiong Xu Court
appears to accept the factual findings of the sentencing courts.
This seems to be the general practice of the Court of Appeal in
England,237 just as it is in the federal system. The Xiong Xu
Court did not decide de novo, for example, each defendant's
status as organizer, manager, or lower-level worker. 238 Instead,
the purpose of the Court's review was to determine whether it
was correct in principle to treat lower level workers as harshly
as their managers. To the Court of Appeal, the latter question is
one of law, which the Court reviews de novo, and the former
question is one of fact, on which the Court defers to the
sentencing court.
235. Xiong Xu, [2007] EWCA (Crim) 3129, [314].
236. Thomas, supra n. 125, at 261.
237. See also R v. Bowyer, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1112, [2010] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 22
(accepting the crown court's findings of facts in a "causing death by dangerous driving"
case noting that "[t]here had been a trial and the judge had the benefit of making his own
assessment of the driving," and that assessment "is one with which this Court should not
interfere").
238. See Xiong Xu, [2007] EWCA (Crim) 3129, [314], [2008] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 50
(holding that, based on the facts before it, the crown court was "entitled" to conclude that
the defendant was "involved in organising the operation").
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3. Review for Error in Principle and Policy Guidance
In the process of deciding cases before it for errors in
principle, the English Court of Appeal issues judgments
providing crown courts with guidance on general sentencing
principles. The Court of Appeal has done this since its creation
in 1907.
First, it is important to explain that in England review for
"error in principle" is far broader than review for "error of law"
in the United States. Of course, some aspects of review for error
in principle in England mirror review for legal error in the
federal courts of appeals. For example, review of sentencing
decisions for error in principle in England includes review for
procedural error, including review to ensure that the sentencing
court identified the appropriate category ran e, 239 provided a
guilty plea discount as required by law, and correctly
identified and considered all of the relevant mitigating and
aggravating facts.24 1 Furthermore, the Court will ensure that a
sentencing decision complies with applicable legislative
mandate and that the crown court correctly interpreted
legislative commands in applying the sentence.242
However, review for error in principle in England involves
much more than simply statutory interpretation and procedural
review; the Court of Appeal also reviews de novo any issue of
sentencing policy affecting the sentence before it. 243 This
includes sentencing courts' decisions on how to interpret and
weigh the sentencing purposes identified by Parliament via
239. See e.g. id., [2007] EWCA (Crim) 3129, [2008] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 50 (reviewing
crown court determinations of sentencing brackets).
240. See Thomas, supra n. 125, at 261.
241. See e.g. R. v. Mills, [2002] EWCA (Crim) 26, [233-34], [2002] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.)
52 (quashing a sentence of imprisonment for a defendant convicted of obtaining services
by deception due in part to the crown court's failure to take into account as a mitigating
factor the fact that the defendant was the mother of dependent children).
242. See e.g. R. v. Rehman & Wood, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 2056, [410-15, 417-19],
[2006] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) (interpreting the "exceptional circumstances" exception in a
mandatory minimum statute to include a defendant who thought he was purchasing a toy
model gun online); R v. Collins, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2534, [18-19], [2010] 2 Cr. App. R.
(S.) 3 (considering the meaning of the phrase "particularly grave injury" in the grievous
bodily harm with intent Guideline to determine whether a sentencing court identified the
correct category range for the appellants).
243. See Thomas, supra n. 125, at 260-61 (describing the types of sentencing decisions
that are reviewed for "error in principle").
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statute. Xiong Xu24 4 is illustrative of this point: Whether lower
level workers of a cannabis operation should be subject to lower
sentences as a general matter, and based on what principles of
sentencing, is a legal issue subject to de novo review in England.
Examples of this kind of review for, and development of,
sentencing policy abound. For instance, the Court of Appeal has
determined that deterrence is the primary legislative policy in
cases in which the defendant possesses a firearm, and it has used
this policy to distinguish between different defendants.245 The
Court of Appeal also reviews sentences for incorrect application
of non-offense-specific penological philosophy. For example, it
has held that, as a matter of law, the statutory maximum need
not be reserved for "the worst possible case which can
realistically be conceived." 246 Instead, a lower court may
sentence a defendant to the maximum "in cases which in the
statutory context are identified as cases of the utmost gravity." 24 7
And "[iln a series of decisions the Court of Appeal has stressed
the need for parsimony in punishment, especially when the
prisons are full." 248 Indeed, the Court of Appeal developed this
parsimony principle as early as the 1980s, long before
Parliament solidified the principle in the Act of 2003 .24
Important for purposes of this comparative analysis, the
Court of Appeal in England reviews sentencing decisions not
just to ensure that the sentencing court was motivated by a
reasonable penal philosophy, but to ensure that the sentencing
court was motivated by the correct penal philosophy. An
244. See supra nn. 216-31 and accompanying text.
245. See R. v Rehman & Wood, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 2056, [413, 417-18], [2006] 1 Cr.
App. R. (S.) (reducing a sentence for a defendant who thought he was purchasing a toy
model gun online, noting that "if an offender has no idea that he is doing anything wrong, a
deterrent sentence will have no deterrent effect upon him," but affirming a sentence for a
defendant who inherited his gun from his grandfather, noting that he was a long-time gun
collector and firearms instructor who should have known the law).
246. R v. Bright, [2008] EWCA (Crim) 462, [588], [2008] 2 Cr. App. R. (S) 102.
247. Id.; see also R. v. Butt, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 47, [367], [2006] 2. Cr. App. R. (S)
304 ("[W]hen judges were asking themselves whether they should pass the maximum
sentence, they should not use their imagination to conjure up unlikely worst possible kinds
of case." (quoting an earlier unreported case)).
248. Wasik, supra n. 192, at 260 (citing R. v. Bibi, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1193; R. v.
Ollerenshaw, [1999] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 65; R. v. Baldwin, [2002] EWCA (Crim) 2647; R.
v. Seed & Stark, [2007] EWCA (Crim) 254, [2007] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 69).
249. Criminal Justice Act, (2003) § 153(2).
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excellent example is R. v. Mills,20 in which the defendant
appealed her eight-month sentence for obtaining credit by
deception.2 5  The Court of Appeal held it was "wrong in
principle" to sentence the defendant to any time in prison due to
the fact that she was the mother of two dependent children, was
of good character, and used the money she obtained "to make a
home for her children." 252 It is significant that the Court did not
simply hold that the trial court failed to consider these factors
and remand (as might have happened in the United States).
Instead, the Court held as a matter of law that, "in cases of
dishonesty, particularly when an offence is committed by a
woman of previous good character who has responsibilities for
children," sentencing courts "should strive to avoid sending
[defendants] to prison and instead use punishments in the
community which enable offenders to repay the harm they have
done." 253 Regardless of whether one agrees with the Court's
approach, there is now a consistent rule guiding sentencing
courts on an important policy issue: how to weigh a defendant's
status as a sole caregiver of dependent children. This is a far
different exercise than the one performed by courts of appeal in
the federal system after Kimbrough, where trial courts are left to
decide on their own issues of such magnitude.
Although federal sentencing scholars might consider the
broader English definition of "legal error" in sentencing a novel
approach, it is actually quite similar to the federal appellate
courts' practice in other areas of the law. Making this argument
in their critique of Kimbrough's requirement of deference to
district court decisions rejecting the crack/powder ratio, a team
of scholars has asserted that "policy conclusions about what the
appropriate sentencing range should be for run-of-the-mill crack
offenses" are no different from the "determination whether to
hold a driver to a standard of negligence or strict liability for any
injuries he causes." 254 Both are legal issues that "would
ordinarily be subject to de novo review," as both "depend[ ] not
on the specific facts of the case, but on a balance of policy
250. [2002] EWCA (Crim) 26, [2002] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 52.
251. Id. at 231.
252. Id. at 232-34.
253. Id. at 231-33.
254. Hessick & Hessick, supra n. 80, at 26-27.
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considerations such as keeping the roads safe, compensating
those who are injured, and avoiding overdeterring people from
driving." 255
Perhaps because observers of the federal system are so
familiar with a broad appellate review for issues of law, the idea
of translating this practice to sentencing appeals should not be
difficult to accept. However, it gets a bit more complicated when
one considers that both the English Court of Appeal and the
federal appellate courts must also perform an enforcement
function related to the sentencing guidelines, on top of their
lawmaking roles. The tension between these roles has led many
observers in the federal system to reject an expanded lawmaking
appellate role out of concern that the courts' enforcement role
would expand in a parallel manner. Fortunately, England
provides a strikingly similar model for testing this concern, in
that since 2003, the Court of Appeal in England has also been
enforcing the Sentencing Council's Definitive Guidelines. Has
its new guidelines-enforcement role changed the English Court
of Appeal's lawmaking role? And has the English Court's
historically broad lawmaking role resulted in a coordinate
expanded enforcement of the Guidelines, as many observers of
the federal courts fear would happen here in the United States?
Answering these questions is critical, as they get to the heart of
the three primary arguments against robust appellate review in
the federal system and raise the potential for a new federal
appellate court model.
4. Appellate Review and the Definitive Sentencing Guidelines
The Court of Appeal in England retained its full lawmaking
powers as a jurisdictional matter after the creation of the
Sentencing Council in 2003. Parliament specifically provided as
much in the Coroners and Justice Act of 2009, which states that
the creation of the Sentencing Council did not abrogate the
power of the Court of Appeal to "provide guidance relating to
the sentencing of offenders in a judgment of the court."2 56
Accordingly, after the creation of the Sentencing Council, the
Court of Appeal has continued to update and revise the
255. Id.
256. Coroners and Justice Act, (2009) § 124(8).
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guidelines to reflect "developments in the law or otherwise."257
This includes revision of both the Council's Definitive
Guidelines and the Court of Appeal's own guidelines.2 58 The
Court also interprets both sets of guidelines, defining terms
provided by the Council that are vague in context. And,
finally, the Court reviews applications of the guidelines,
including how to apply the guidelines in cases where new sets of
facts "do not fit easily within the guideline categories."260
Again, how this works in practice becomes clearer after
reviewing some examples. R. v. Collins 261 illustrates the Court
of Appeal's most basic function related to the guidelines:
interpretation. In Collins, the Court considered the meaning of
the phrase "particularly grave injury" to determine whether a
sentencing court identified the correct category range for the
appellants.262 In that case, the appellarits, acting together,
brought a gun to a bar to confront the victim, and, after an
altercation, one of them shot the victim twice; one shot
perforated the victim's colon close to his liver and kidney, the
other hit his groin area.263 At the time, the Definitive Guideline
broke up the offense of grievous bodily harm with intent into
three categories.264 Since the crime involved premeditation, the
Guideline placed the defendants in the highest category range
(ten to sixteen years) if the "[v]ictim suffered . .. particularly
grave injury," and in the middle category range (seven to ten
265
years) if the victim did not. The sentencing court held that the
victim did indeed suffer "particularly grave injury," placed the
defendants in the highest category, and sentenced two of them-
257. D.A. Thomas, Sentencing: Manslaughter by Reason of Provocation-Relevance of
Sentencing Guidelines Council Guidelines, 5 Crim. L.R. 415, 418 (2011).
258. Id. at 418-19.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 419 (quoting R. v. Hussain, [2010] EWCA Crim 94, [2010] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.)
60).
261. [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2534, [2010] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 3.
262. Id. at 18-19.
263. Id. at 17-18.
264. Sentencing Guidelines Council, Assault And Other Offences Against The Person,
Definitive Guideline at 12-17, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.
sentencingcouncil.org.uk/docs/Assault andotheroffences-againstthe.personaccessible
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considered the "organizer" and the "gunman"-to fourteen years
and the third one, who had a lesser role, to ten years.266
On appeal, the defendants argued that they should not have
been sentenced in the highest category range because the
injuries sustained by the victim were not permanent, did not
involve multiple fractures, and thus were not "particularly
grave." 267 The Court of Appeal affirmed the sentence and
dismissed the appeal. In doing so, the Court analyzed the legal
issue of the meaning of "particularly grave," holding that an
injury did not need to be permanent to be particularly grave, and
that injuries involving bullet wounds to "vital parts of the body"
and requiring major surgeries were particularly grave. 268 As a
result of this decision it is now the law that such injuries are
"particularly grave."26
The lawmaking appellate function reflected in Collins-
Guidelines interpretation-is familiar to observers of federal
sentencing. Indeed, federal courts of appeals will review district
courts' interpretation of the sentencing Guidelines de novo.270
However, a second example, R. v. Anigbugu,2 7 1 shows a less
familiar appellate lawmaking function in the context of the
Guidelines-that is, what the Court of Appeal does when the
application of a specific guidelines range, properly calculated,
leads to an error in sentencing principles. Anigbugu involved
several appeals by the government, all challenging the sentences
266. Collins, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2534, [19].
267. Id.
268. Id. at 19-20.
269. The Court has over time created a common law defining "particularly grave"
injury. See R. v. Olawo, [2008] EWCA (Crim) 528, [646-47], [2008] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 113
("[T]he expression particularly grave injury must be read in the context, which is that of
the offence of inflicting grievous bodily harm. Particularly serious harm must mean harm
which is particularly serious by the standards of grievous bodily harm generally."); R. v.
Shannon, [2008] EWCA (Crim) 2131, [553-54], [2009] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 95 (holding that
a fractured jaw is not a "particularly grave injury" within the meaning of the Guideline); R.
v Howard, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1984, [579-80], [2010] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 88 (same
regarding a broken hip).
270. See e.g. US. v. Serfass, 684 F.3d 548, 550-51 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that
sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(5) for importation of amphetamine or
methamphetamine does not have a knowledge requirement); U.S. v. Chauncey, 420 F.3d
864, 877-78 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that manslaughter is a "crime of violence" under
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2).
271. Attorney General's References Nos. 73, 75, and 03 of 2010, [2011] EWCA (Crim)
633, [2011] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 100.
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of defendants convicted of the same crime.272 In all three cases,
the defendants forced entry into the victim's home for the
purpose of burglarizin it, and while in the home, raped the
victims living there.27 At the time, the Council's Definitive
Guideline broke up the offense of rape into three different
categories; the defendants all fell into the lowest category which
applied to "a single offense of rape by a single offender.' 74 This
category had a starting point of five years, with a range of four
to eight years. 2 75 The two higher ranges, which went up to
nineteen years in prison, did not apply to the defendants, as
these ranges targeted cases with specific aggravating factors,
none of which applied in Anigbugu. 6 The trial courts sentenced
two of the defendants to eight years imprisonment and one to six
years imprisonment with an extension period of six years.277 The
Attorney General sought review of the sentences for being
unduly lenient.
The Court's description of the specific crime involved in
these cases- rape in a home during a burglary-is notable for
its empathy for the victims, calling this a "pitiless, wicked
crime."278 The Court called it the "ultimate nightmare" when the
home, "our safest refuge," where we are at our most
"defenceless," is violated. 79 There was "no room in the
sentencing process for mercy" for defendants who committed
272. Id. 1-9.
273. Id.
274. Sentencing Guidelines Council, Sexual Offenses Act 2003, Definitive Guideline,
http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/webSexualOffencesAct_2003.pdf 25 (Apr.
2007) (accessed Sept. 26, 2013; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process) [hereinafter "Sexual Offences Guideline"]. The Sentencing Council recently
closed consultation on a new Definitive Guideline for sexual offenses that considers the
impact of rape in one's home, and thus, when issued, would presumably override
Anigbugu. See Sentence Council, Sexual Offenses Guideline Consultation, http://
sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/sexual-offencesconsultation-guideline_(web).pdf
(2012) [hereinafter "Sexual Offenses Guideline"] (accessed Sept. 26, 2013; copy on file
with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
275. Sexual Offences Guideline, supra n. 274.
276. The listed aggravating factors were: "abduction or detention; offender aware that he
is suffering from a sexually transmitted infection; more than one offender acting together;
abuse of trust; offence motivated by prejudice (race, religion, sexual orientation, physical
disability); sustained attack." Id. at 25.
277. Anigbugu, [2011] EWCA (Crim) 633, [ 11, 26, 51].
278. Id. 1 3.
279. Id. TT 2-3.
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such "pitiless, life-scarring, deliberately committed crimes.
According to the Court, because "culpability of the criminal is at
its highest and the harm done to the victim is at its most grave"
in these types of cases, "they should be approached as if they
were among the most serious offences of their kind."281
The Court of Appeal acknowledged the conflicting
Definitive Guideline on rape, but declared that it would be
"wrong in principle" for offenses like these, where rape has been
committed after breaking into the home, "to be treated as a
single offence or rape by a single offender" as the Guideline
required.282 As the Court explained, "no sentence should be an
unjust sentence and . . . no guideline can require that an unjust
sentence should be imposed." 283 But the Court exercised its
authority to "explain or to offer a definitive sentencing guideline
of its own" for cases of "rape committed after or in the course of
burglary in a home," identified a new starting point-twelve
years-and discussed potential aggravating facts for such an
offense.284 Separately analyzing each of the defendants' cases,
the Court then raised two of the sentences to fifteen years and
one to fourteen and a half.285
Anigbugu highlights the undiminished power of the Court
of Appeal to review sentences for error in principle, despite the
existence of controlling Sentencing Council guidelines. The
Anigbugu Court explicitly stated that the creation of the
Sentencing Council has left "undiminished" the "jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeal Criminal Division to amplify, to explain or
to offer a definitive sentencing guideline of its own, to issue
guidelines if it thinks fit."286 In short, the Court will not hesitate
to overrule a Definitive Guideline where its application will
result an error in principle. In Anigbugu, for example, it was an
error in principle to treat rape in the context of a home burglary
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Importantly, Anigbugu did not involve a legal error in the
application of Definitive Guideline in the sense that lawyers and
judges use that term in the United States. The sentences
originally imposed were within the properly calculated category
range set out in a Guideline that would have been subject to a
presumption of reasonableness in many of the federal courts of
appeals. Accordingly, and considering the fact that the
Definitive Guideline was clearly intended to cover the field of
sentencing in rape cases, it would not be a stretch to say that
reversal in one of the federal courts of appeals would have been
extremely unlikely. However, in England, because the
application of the Definitive Guideline resulted in an error in
principle, the Court of Appeal did not hesitate to correct the
error by suggesting a new starting point for calculation of the
appropriate sentence.
While Anigbugu and Collins exemplify how the Court of
Appeal functions in cases in which it must interpret or
supplement the Council's Definitive Guidelines, R. v.
Thornley87 shows how the Court of Appeal deals with potential
errors in the Guidelines themselves. In Thornley, the defendant
pleaded guilty to manslaughter by reason of provocation for
stabbing and killing the victim with a kitchen knife. 288 The
defendant had armed himself with a knife prior to going to
confront the victim to "threaten" him, and deliberately stabbed
him twice.289 In cases involving a low degree of provocation, as
was the case in Thornley, the Council's Definitive Guideline set
a starting point of twelve years, with a range of ten years to
life. 290 The crown court sentenced the defendant to sixteen
years, varying the sentence primarily because the defendant used
a knife in the commission of the crime.29 1 The defendant sought
leave to appeal, arguing that the sentencing court weighed the
fact that he used a knife too heavily in the sentencing
decision.292 Although the Guideline for manslaughter by reason
287. [2011] EWCA (Crim) 153; [2011] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 62.
288. Id. at 363-64.
289. Id. at 364.
290. Id. at 366.
291. Id. at 365 (discussing, among other factors, "the need for courts to be alert on
appropriate occasions to impose deterrent sentences on those who carry knives").
292. Id.
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of provocation lists a number of aggravating factors that justify
increasing the sentence above twelve years, none refer to the
293particular weapon used.
The Court held that the crown court properly relied on the
use of knife as a significant aggravating feature.294 It also
acknowledged that the Sentencing Council's Definitive
Guideline did not contemplate possession of a knife as a
particularly aggravating factor, but stated that several new
"developments" required that the use of a knife in the
commission of a crime be "regarded as a more significant
feature of agravation than it was when the guideline was
published." 29  The Court was careful to point out that each of
these developments had occurred since the Sentencing Council
issued its Definitive Guideline.296 However, as the Court
explained, interpretations of the Guidelines must include
"consideration of the subsequent thinking of this Court and of
the legislature on sentencing issues."2 97
IV. FINDINGS ABOUT ENGLISH APPELLATE REVIEW AND
PROPOSED MODEL FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS
A. Observations-Freeing Appellate Review from a Binary Mold
This survey of English appellate review undermines several
aspects of the normative, functional, and institutional arguments
against robust substantive review of criminal sentences in the
federal courts of appeals.
293. See generally Sentencing Guidelines Council, Manslaughter by Reason of
Provocation, Guideline, http://www.banksr.co.uk/images/Guidelines/Definitive%20Guide
lines/Provocation-in Manslaughtercases_2005.pdf (Nov. 2005) (accessed Sept. 26, 2013;
copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
294. Thornley, [2011] EWCA (Crim) 153, [366]. Ultimately, however, the Court
reduced Thornley's sentence from sixteen years to twelve, due to the crown court's failure
to consider certain mitigating features. Id
295. Id. at 366. These developments included, for example, recent Court of Appeal
decisions emphasizing the importance of deterrence in knife-related cases and a "legislative
change[]" that raised the minimum term for those committing murder with a knife from
fifteen years to twenty-five years. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 365.
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The English experience most clearly provides a rebuttal to
the functional argument that there is no principled way to
implement substantive reasonableness review without simply
resorting to re-sentencing defendants on appeal. Although the
English Court of Appeal does re-sentence some defendants, it
does not do so in every case: When the sentence falls within the
guidelines range, the Court of Appeal explicitly says that it will
not tinker with it. In these cases, the Court takes a mixed-
deference approach, deferring to the sentencing court's ultimate
decision and findings of facts, but retaining de novo review of
sentencing principles. By setting principled and clear limits on
appellate review like the no-tinker rule, the Court has stopped
itself from becoming essentially a second trial court for
sentencing issues. At the same time, the Court retains the ability
to issue guidance on broad issues of sentencing policy, thus
promoting application of uniform, consistent, and clear
sentencing policies throughout the country.
This survey also suggests flaws in the normative argument
against appellate review-that deference is necessary to prevent
over-enforcement of guidelines and to ensure individualized
sentences. In fact, England's appellate model tells us that
appellate review of sentences need not be solely focused on
enforcement of guidelines. Instead, review to establish
sentencing principles and review to enforce sentencing
guidelines can occur independently, each cabined by separate
limits. In England, the no-tinker rule results in enforcement of
the guidelines, but it does not limit the Court's ability to provide
general policy guidance and correct errors in legal principle such
as occurred in Anigbugu. Similarly, the Court enforces the
guidelines by deferring to the Sentencing Council on issues of
sentencing policy (i.e. the guidelines), but retains some measure
of its lawmaking power by reviewing application of the
guidelines to ensure compliance with new developments in the
law or taking note of some indication of error in applying past
principles. Of course, these two roles are intertwined. When the
Court of Appeal defers to the Sentencing Council, for example,
it both enforces the guidelines and gives up some of its
lawmaking role. But the English practice demonstrates that it is
a mistake to lump these two functions together as we so often do
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in the United States. Doing so unnecessarily limits the function
and usefulness of the appellate courts.
Finally, the English experience provides evidence that both
supports and undercuts the institutional (or you-are-there)
argument against robust appellate review. On the one hand, the
Court of Appeal routinely re-sentences defendants, and this
practice is generally accepted as the norm: Research revealed no
critics of this practice among English observers based on an
"expertise" rationale. Proponents of the you-are-there rationale,
however, will counter that the Court of Appeal, unlike our
federal courts of appeals, has the power to hear new evidence. 2 98
Indeed, the ability to modify sentences and the ability to hear
new evidence appear to be linked, as the Court of Appeal
presumably retains the ability to make the "right" sentencing
choice by hearing further evidence. This provides some support
for the argument that, in a system in which the appellate courts
are limited to reviewing the record below, the trial courts are
indeed the better institutional actors to make sentencing
decisions.
But in practice it appears relatively rare for the Court of
Appeal to hear new evidence.299 The Court will decline to hear
new evidence for a number of reasons, including a refusal to
hear evidence that could have been presented at trial.300
Accordingly, it is doubtful that the Court of Appeal has access to
the type of demeanor evidence that proponents of the
institutional critique envision when urging the retention of all
sentencing discretion in the district courts. And yet there is
better evidence undermining the institutional critique: the
English Court's mixed deference to trial court sentencing
decisions when a sentence falls within the guidelines range. The
Court of Appeal does not simply modify sentences and re-
sentence defendants on each appeal. When the sentence on
appeal falls within the guidelines range, the Court of Appeal
explicitly will not tinker with it. Instead, the Court defers to the
298. See supra nn. 159-62 and accompanying text.
299. Email from Andrew Ashworth, Professor of English Law, U. Oxford (Apr. 15,
2013, 8:31 a.m. EST) (on file with author).
300. See Sprack, supra n. 145, at 491-93; How to Appeal: A Guide to the Criminal
Appeal System 34 (Justice ed. 2011) (pointing out that "[i]f there is new evidence which
was not available for the trial, the Court of Appeal will sometimes look at the new evidence
and decide if it might have led the jury to reach a not guilty verdict.").
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sentencing court on the ultimate sentencing decision and the
findings of facts, but retains de novo review of sentencing
principles.
This mixed-deference appellate model is no doubt an
institutional choice reflective of the accepted wisdom in England
that various actors in the criminal justice system can, and
should, share responsibility for making the sentencing decision.
While sentencing judges might have a better view of demeanor
evidence, the individual defendant, and the specific case,
appellate judges might be better at developing consistent and
uniform judgments about community norms and policies,
understanding and interpreting legislative intent, and making
difficult judgments about generally applicable purposes of
sentencing.
It is thus important that those who are involved in
designing the post-Booker sentencing regime avoid equating the
jurisprudential idea of discretion with the institutional practice
of deference. When we say that a trial court needs "discretion"
in the sentencing context, we usually mean the ability to choose
among a wide range of options to arrive at a sentence that is
appropriate for the individual defendant. This is not about who
should make the sentencing choice, but about how the choice
should be made. The English example shows that appellate
courts are perfectly capable of providing guidance on sentencing
law and policy, while still providing trial courts the discretion
they need to craft sentences that are appropriate for each
individual defendant.
B. Proposed Model
With these observations in mind, I propose a new model of
substantive reasonableness review in which the federal appellate
courts borrow several aspects of the English Court of Appeal's
"mixed deference" approach to review of criminal sentences.
First, to promote consistent application of sentencing principles
throughout the jurisdiction, courts of appeals in the federal
system should conduct de novo review of sentencing law and
principles, including review of guidelines interpretation and
decisions on how to weigh the § 3553(a) factors. Appellate
courts would give no deference to trial courts on these legal
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issues. At the same time, however, courts of appeals should also
apply principled limits to their review of sentencing decisions,
including, for example, adopting a presumption of
reasonableness and deferring to trial courts on factual findings,
the choice of actual sentence, and the application of sentencing
principles and law to the facts.
This proposed model would resemble the English appellate
review in many respects. First, the federal courts of appeals
would interpret and apply the statutory sentencing principles
codified by Congress in § 3553(a): the retributive principle of
just deserts, which requires that sentences be proportional to the
culpability of the offender and the harm caused, the goal of
incapacitation and protection of society from harmful
individuals, the principle of rehabilitation, and specific and
general deterrence. 30 1 Appellate courts should be obliged to
confront, interpret, and provide guidance on the meanings of
these purposes. They should identify broad sentencing principles
and penological philosophies that guide the application of these
principles in broad categories of cases-such as the English rule
barring a maximum sentence except in "cases of the utmost
gravity." 302 As an example, federal appellate courts could
provide a definitive interpretation of the statutory directive that
rehabilitation is not a justification for imprisonment and give
guidance on when and how non-prison sanctions should be
used .303
In addition to providing general guidance on the meaning
of the statutory factors, the federal courts of appeals would also
have a duty to provide guidance on how to weigh the § 3553(a)
factors in specific tpes of cases or in cases involving specific
types of offenders.3 Instead of simply allowing trial courts to
treat crack cocaine cases as harshly or as leniently as they wish,
under my proposal the Supreme Court would have articulated a
301. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
302. See supra text accompanying nn. 246-47.
303. Cf Miller, supra n. 4, at 477-78 (articulating rehabilitation and non-prison
sanctions as areas in which the Commission could provide further guidance and "bring
purposes of sentencing into the guideline system").
304. Cf id. at 464-65 (arguing that, in order to facilitate appellate review, trial courts
must "evaluate purposes in terms of offense and offender factors shared by similar
defendants, or ... they should evaluate the purposes to be achieved in terms of paradigms
identifying common crimes and unusual elements").
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clear policy in Kimbrough that did not just reject the crack-to-
powder ratio, but that also provided general guidance on how to
determine when a crack-related offense is more serious than a
powder-related offense. Similarly, in McBride305 the court of
appeals would have provided clear, direct, and binding guidance
to trial courts on the importance of incapacitation and
incarceration in specific types of child-pornography cases. The
McBride court could have, for example, held that incapacitation
is the primary purpose of sentencing in cases involving
defendants who have prior convictions for hands-on sexual
offenses. Were there such a rule, it would be clear to sentencing
judges that evidence of a defendant's having experienced
physical abuse would be of diminished importance as a
mitigating factor in sentencing if he was also likely to commit
additional sexual offenses.
I emphasize that I do not intend here to debate or support
specific sentencing principles. Scholars far more versed in
criminal philosophy than I have done that at length, and their
work, along with research from the Sentencing Commission, can
provide valuable information for courts attempting to apply the
model proposed here. My purpose is simply to point out that we
as a society should be making these hard penological decisions,
and that empowering the federal courts of appeals to use robust
review in the context of the post-Booker sentencing regime
would be a good place to start.
While the model I propose calls for expanded appellate
review of sentencing law and principles, much of the remaining
aspects of the sentencing decision--deferential review of factual
findings, for example, the choice of actual sentence, and the
application of sentencing principles and law to the facts-would
still be reviewed deferentially. Of course, as any legal realist
would point out, deferring to trial courts on the application of
sentencing principles to facts and the ultimate formulation and
imposition of sentence opens up the possibility of disparity in
sentencing. One judge's view of how long a sentence must be to
incapacitate a defendant can easily differ from another judge's
view on the same topic.
305. See supra text accompanying nn. 53-62.
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However, several factors suggest this is an acceptable risk.
First, research after Booker has shown persuasively that the
existence of the advisory guidelines provides an anchor to
ensure that similar cases result in sentences generally within a
relatively close range. 306 Moreover, adopting the English model
as proposed here would add a second level of sentencing
guidance, and therefore sentencing consistency, which does not
exist in the post-Booker sentencing regime: guidance that is tied
to general sentencing principles, not to the Sentencing
Guidelines.
Furthermore, I am of the view, as are others, that some
disparity of result is acceptable, if not required, in a proper
sentencing regime.307 Indeed, "[u]niformity can itself be
'unwarranted': when unprincipled, blind uniformity promotes
inequality."308 Any proposal for expanded appellate review must
balance both the need for consistent application of sentencing
principles and the need for individualized sentences tailored to
the circumstances of each individual defendant. Through this
proposal, I seek to do just that. To borrow from an eminently
reasonable English sentencing philosophy, the main goal of
expanded appellate review in the post-Booker regime should be
"uniformity of approach, not uniformity of outcome."309 The
goal is to allow sentencing judges to pass judgment "within a
306. See e.g. Jelani Jefferson Exum, The More Things Change: A Psychological Case
Against Allowing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to Stay the Same in Light of Gall,
Kimbrough, and New Understandings ofReasonableness Review, 58 Cath. U. L. Rev. 115,
146 (2008) (noting that "[t]he psychology of decision-making reveals that once a judge
calculates the Guidelines range, she will be influenced by that range, even if she ultimately
decides to impose a sentence that falls outside of it"). Experts like Professor Exum are
critical of the anchoring effect of the Guidelines. Id. at 146-50 (proposing a range of
alternatives, from repositioning the Guidelines calculation in the sentencing process so that
it does not occur as a first step to reinventing the Guidelines as a statistical reporting
measure instead of a calculation of sentence); but see Sutton, supra n. 97, at 86 (arguing
that "appellate courts ought to be able to treat the guidelines as an organizing principle" in
order to protect the consistency principle animating those guidelines). I agree that any
outcome-focused consistency measure like the Guidelines must be designed, at both the
appellate and trial levels, in a way that that prevents over-enforcement and allows for
individualization of sentences. The study of the English system presented here supports the
work of Professor Exum and others who argue that consistency in sentencing can be
achieved in ways other than through strict enforcement of the Guidelines.
307. See Lynch, supra n. 7, at 6; Gertner, supra n. 4, at 584; Wasik, supra n. 192, at 260.
308. Stith & Cabranes, supra n. 4, at 105-06 (emphasis original).
309. Wasik, supra n. 192, at 259.
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framework of principles and guidelines set out in advance, so
that court decisions are consistent in their approach and the
outcomes are reasonably predicable." 310 The combination of
these overarching principles and a "structured methodology" in
sentencing promotes consistency in sentencing and ensures that
"difference[s] between dispositions [are] likely to reflect legally
relevant factors."311 Just as in the English system, under my
proposal, consistency of approach can be achieved across the
federal courts of appeals through a "structured methodology"-
here sentencing procedures developed and enforced through
procedural reasonableness review-and through "a framework
of principles and guidelines"-here a combination of the
advisory guidelines and sentencing principles established by the
courts, Congress, and the Commission that are enforced through
substantive reasonableness review. While this method may not
guarantee consistency of outcome, it should at least ensure, as in
England, that outcomes are "reasonably predictable." 3 12
At the same time, focusing on uniformity of approach will
allow the federal courts of appeals "to structure judicial
discretion, rather than to eliminate it."3 13 Importantly, because
the increased appellate scrutiny proposed here is not tied to
specific sentencing outcomes such as specific Guidelines ranges,
sentencing judges would have the discretion to do what they do
best: apply general legal rules to individual cases, and arrive at
sentencing decisions that are appropriate for each individual
defendant.
C. Impediments to Full Implementation of the English Model
While appellate review under my proposed model would,
in many respects, resemble appellate review in England, at least
two aspects of English appellate review would not be as easily
or appropriately transferred to the federal courts of appeals:
310. Ashworth, supra n. 145, at 28.
311. Roberts, supra n. 188, at 15.
312. Ashworth, supra n. 145, at 28.
313. Wasik, supra n. 192, at 254 (citing Andrew von Hirsch, The Sentencing
Commission's Functions, in The Sentencing Commission and Its Guidelines (Andrew von
Hirsch, Kay A. Knapp & Michael Tonry eds. N.E. U. Press 1987)).
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excessive sentence modification and the development of full
guidelines judgments.
1. Excessive Sentence Modification
I see several impediments to adopting the English practice
of excessive sentence modification, which I define as an
appellate court's de novo review of a sentence and substitution
of a different sentence if the sentence imposed by the trial court
falls outside the guidelines range.
One impediment is the inability of the federal courts of
appeals to hear evidence not introduced in the trial court.3 14 The
English practice, in contrast, reflects a fundamental difference in
thinking about the role of appellate review generally, and in
sentencing specifically: The purpose of sentence review in
England is not just to determine whether the law was followed
and the sentence had a sound basis, but to determine the correct
sentence at the time of the appeal. Imposing such a dramatic
shift in understanding of the function of our courts of appeals is
unlikely as a practical matter.
Furthermore, excessive sentence modification most
implicates the cost and efficiency concerns of those opposed to
expanded appellate review.3 15 Indeed, as the analysis above
shows, modification of excessive sentences in England is, at
least in part, re-sentencing at the appellate level. Although the
Court of Appeal has implemented measures-like the no-tinker
rule-to limit the expense and reach of such a broad power, it is
perhaps wise to focus reform in the federal courts of appeals on
a more confined expansion designed to ensure consistency of
sentencing approach rather than consistency of outcome.
2. Issuance of Guidelines Judgments on Appeal
The second aspect of appellate review that I would not
adopt for the federal courts of appeals is articulation of full
guidelines judgments like those announced in Anigbugu to
divide entire offenses into categories and suggest a range of
specific sentences for each. First, judicial development of such
314. See supra rn. 159-62 and accompanying text.
315. See discussion infra § V(D)(2).
143
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
broadly applicable guidelines would -require (and often does
require in England) the federal courts of appeals to issue
decisions that go far afield from the matters at issue in the cases
before them. In England, the Court of Appeal has a history of
authority providing a basis for these decisions, but there is no
similar history in the federal courts of appeals that would justify
and legitimize such a practice here. On the contrary, there is
long tradition in the United States that both discourages courts'
use of advisory opinions and maintains the distinction between
holdings and dicta.3 16 This tradition, which has its roots in the
federal constitution's Case or Controversy Clause,31 1 limits
appellate consideration to issues specifically in controversy.
Guidelines judgments would also be of limited utility in the
federal courts of appeals, especially as developing guidelines is
one of the Sentencing Commission's primary duties.
Furthermore, without the power to re-sentence, the federal
courts of appeals will not be able to tie their sentencing policies
to particular sentences. And the power to issue guidelines
judgments would be unnecessary, as the federal courts of
appeals would simply interpret or clarify guidelines as needed in
specific cases. For example, if the Anigbugu appeal had been
heard before one of the federal courts of appeals, the court could
have held that a rape committed during a home-invasion
burglary must be treated with far more seriousness than would a
"single case of rape." The court would then have remanded the
case to the trial court for re-sentencing in light of this newly
announced principle.
Furthermore, the fact that dictum is not binding does not
prevent the federal courts of appeals from surveying history and
current circumstances, reasoning by analogy, drawing broad
conclusions, and engaging in discussions that can be
characterized as dicta. Appellate courts do this all the time to
provide guidance, to suggest to other branches the need for
potential action, or simply to provide context for their
316. See 3 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 3529.1 (3d ed. 1999-2013); Culombe v. Conn., 367 U.S. 568, 635-36 (1961) (Warren,
C.J., concurring) ("It has not been the custom of the Court, in deciding the cases which
come before it, to write lengthy and abstract dissertations upon questions which are neither
presented by the record nor necessary to a proper disposition of the issues raised.").
317. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. (providing that "[tihe judicial Power shall extend"
only to certain enumerated cases and controversies).
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holdings.3 18 So had one of the federal courts of appeals decided
Anigbugu, it could legitimately have suggested that the
Commission provide new guidelines addressing cases involving
rape in the home, and further suggested various considerations
and aggravating circumstances that might be involved in
categorizing such cases.
And finally, the Court of Appeal's decision to continue
issuing guidelines judgments after the creation of the Sentencing
Council has been criticized by criminal-sentencing experts in
England, who have voiced concern over the potential confusion
in roles that might result from continuing this practice when the
Sentencing Council has been specifically tasked with
researching, developing, and implementing these kinds of broad,
system-wide guidelines. 3 19  Thus, considering the dubious
benefits and the sure backlash that would result from granting
the federal courts of appeals the power to issue guidelines, it is
perhaps wise to limit their guidelines interpretations to the
controversies before them, in line with the historic American
approach.
In sum, the model I propose here would require the federal
courts of appeals to adopt the English model in part by
reviewing de novo solely issues related to sentencing principles.
However, that review would be limited by the traditional rules
addressing the weight and interpretation of dicta and the
limitations on advisory opinions, and the courts of appeals
318. See e.g. Marc McAllister, Dicta Redefined, 47 Willamette L. Rev. 161, 177-80
(2011).
319. See Ashworth, Coroners and Justice Act, supra n. 209, at 394 (expressing concern
that sharing responsibility for articulation of guidelines could result in a "confusion of
roles" between the Court of Appeal and the Sentencing Council and suggesting that "the
Court of Appeals should confine itself to legal interpretation ... and guidance incidental to
deciding particular cases") (footnote omitted); Wasik, supra n. 176, at 17-18 (cautioning
that the Court of Appeal and the Council should "avoid cutting across each other in further
development of sentencing guidelines"); Archbold, supra n. 145, at § 5-144 (noting that
"the suggestion that the court retains a power to issue guidelines (with recommended
ranges, etc.) is highly controversial," as it "runs counter" to the current legislative intent to
have guidelines "issued by a second statutory body with membership reflecting a broad
range of expertise and interests, and only after full consultation and within the context of a
rigid statutory framework"); but see D.A. Thomas, Sentencing: Burglary of Dwellings-
General Guidance, 4 Crim. L. Rev. 295, 299 (2009) (praising the Court of Appeal's
decision in R v. Saw, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1, [2009] 2 All E.R. 1138, to issue a new
guideline for sentencing in cases of domestic burglary, and warning against any efforts by
Parliament to "subordinate the Court of Appeal to the proposed new Sentencing Council").
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would not assume any new power to modify sentences or review
the resulting sentences for excessiveness.
C. Changes to the System Necessitated by Adoption
of the English Model
From a system-design perspective, implementation of the
expanded appellate review that I propose here should be fairly
straightforward. The jurisdiction for such review already
exists.32o And such review could fit seamlessly into the
substantive reasonableness review mandated by the Supreme
Court in Booker and revised in later cases such as Rita and Gall.
The federal courts of appeals also have the benefit of Camp II
cases like Pugh, Amezcua- Vasquez, and Padilla, which provide
models for how searching de novo review of sentencing
principles can be conducted within the context of a Booker
substantive reasonableness review analysis. 32 1 And finally, the
federal courts of appeals already have the expertise necessary to
begin immediately reviewing issues of sentencing policy de
novo. They routinely review issues of law and policy de novo in
many other areas of the law, and can easily translate the
procedures and standards of such review to the criminal-
sentencing context.32 2
That being said, implementing the model suggested here
will require several changes to statutory and judicial procedure.
An obvious example is the reversal of decisions like Kimbrough
that require appellate deference to district court decisions on
sentencing policy. These decisions, which set the appellate
standard for review of district court decisions on sentencing
principles at abuse of discretion, are inconsistent with the
expanded appellate review I propose.
In addition, this proposal would require greater written
explanation of sentencing purposes, both at the trial and
appellate levels, but scholars have long argued that both the
federal district courts and the federal courts of appeals should
clearly tie their sentencing decisions to their sentencing
320. See Rosenbaum, supra n. 2, at 920-21.
321. See supra nn. 67-76 and accompanying text.
322. See supra nn. 254-55 and accompanying text.
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purposes.323 As the Sentencing Reform Committee of the
bipartisan Constitution Project explained,
careful statements of reasons are essential to meaningful
appellate review of sentencing decisions. They are
extraordinarily useful to other sentencing judges faced with
analogous cases. They form an important component of the
feedback to sentencing rule makers necessary for
improving any sentencing system. And they inform
litigants, the Sentencing Commission, Congress, and the
public about how the law is being applied, which is
essential if the country is to understand and have
confidence in the federal sentencing system.324
Put simply, unless appellate courts can evaluate the reasons
behind sentencing decisions, a common law of sentencing
cannot develop.32
Another less obvious, but no less important, practice that
would require change is the Supreme Court's policy of denying
certiorari on guidelines-interpretation issues. In Braxton v.
United States, the Court held that it would be "restrained and
circumspect" in using its certiorari power to resolve circuit
conflicts on issues of guidelines interpretation, deferring to the
Commission in such instances. 326 The Court's hesitancy to
approach and decide issues of guidelines interpretation is
inconsistent with the broad review of sentencing policy as law
advocated here. It fosters inconsistency of approach, and
unnecessarily defers to the Commission on issues that it may
never resolve. Indeed, others have lamented that the
Commission is notoriously slow to identify and resolve
323. See supra nn. 94-96 and accompanying text.
324. Constitution Project Sentencing Initiative, Recommendations for Federal Criminal
Sentencing in a Post-Booker World, 18 Fed. Senten. Rep. 310, 317 (June 2006).
325. See Berman, supra n. 4, at 111.
326. 500 U.S. 344, 348 (1991) (noting as well that the Commission has not only the duty
to "review and revise" the Guidelines but also the "unusual" power to give retroactive
effect to Guidelines amendments reducing sentences, and seeming to take this to mean that
the Commission holds the initial and primary responsibility of guidelines interpretation);
see also Douglas A. Berman, The Sentencing Commission as Guidelines Supreme Court:
Responding to Circuit Conflicts, 7 Fed. Senten. Rep. 142, 142-45 (1994) (describing and
criticizing the Sentencing Commission's role as a "Guidelines Supreme Court" after the
Braxton decision); Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Law in the Supreme Court's 1990-91
Term, 4 Fed. Senten. Rep. 58, 58, 59 (1991) (lamenting that the Court in Braxton had
"decided. . . to wash its hands of sentencing" by determining that it should not "develop or
express its own views about the wisdom of sentencing policies").
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guidelines conflicts and that its eventual resolutions lack
empirical foundation, are based on unwise political pressure, and
are unsupported by public comment.327 As the Court of Appeal
in England does, the Supreme Court should resolve circuit splits
on issues of sentencing policy throughout periods of change,
promoting consistent and clear application of sentencing policy
throughout the federal courts.
This, of course, doesn't mean that the Commission can play
no role in the interpretation of the Guidelines. But again, the
English experience provides a more moderate example than the
stark avoidance policy of the Supreme Court: The Court of
Appeal defers to the Sentencing Council's Definitive
Guidelines, but will nevertheless provide a contradictory
interpretation when the law compels it. In Thornley, for
example, the Court of Appeal acted to update the Sentencing
Council's Definitive Guideline on manslaughter by reason of
provocation to take into account later developments in the law
on knife violence. Thornley is typical of the relationship
between the Sentencing Council and the Court of Appeal, which
is characterized by both shared lawmaking responsibility and
mutual respect and deference. 328 In short, the Supreme Court
could apply some deference to the Commission's interpretation
of its own guidelines, as it would for any agency, without the
Court's avoiding its responsibility to resolve circuit conflicts and
ensure correct and consistent application of the law.
D. Potential Criticisms
1. Concerns about Judicial Minimalism and Judicial Activism
A legitimacy concern is raised whenever the judiciary takes
on a significant lawmaking role, as is suggested here. One might
ask whether Congress or the Sentencing Commission should be
developing the criminal policies and laws that are applied
throughout our country. The short answer is yes. Ideally,
Congress, the broadly populist branch of the federal
government, should be setting those policies. And the
327. See e.g. Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1631,
1643-44 (2012).
328. See supra nn. 186-90 and accompanying text
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Sentencing Commission, which can view sentencing from a
wider perspective and is made up of sentencing experts, should
be researching, developing, and implementing sentencing
policy. However, both institutions have been the subject of
criticism for failing to fully perform these tasks.329 Although
Congress has identified general goals of punishment-the
proportionality, rehabilitation, deterrence, incapacitation, and
retribution goals of § 3553(a)-these goals are abstract and may
330often conflict in specific cases.
Instead of providing particularized guidance, Congress
delegated at least part of the task to the Sentencing Commission,
directing it "to establish sentencing policies and practices" that
"[a]ssure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth
in section § 3553(a)(2)."33 1 But as a number of scholars have
pointed out, instead of making decisions about which sentencing
philosophies and purposes control in which kinds of cases, the
Commission chose to study historical sentencing outcomes and
develop a system of sentencing outcomes unmoored by
sentencing purposes.332 This decision has been widely criticized,
particularly for emphasizing consistency of outcome at the
expense of important concerns of individualization. 333
Furthermore, even if the Commission was inclined to
consider sentencing purposes in a meaningful way, the Supreme
Court effectively eliminated the Commission's ability to ensure
sentencing consistency when it made the Guidelines advisory in
Booker. This is where the utility of courts of appeals becomes
apparent. "Congress did not intend to vest the Commission with
sole authority to consider purposes in sentencing; this
responsibility was to be shared by the Commission and
sentencing judges." 334 Section § 3553(a) provides that "[t]he
court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with the [statutory] purposes." 3 Through
329. See supra nn. 89-93 (collecting authorities) and accompanying text.
330. Berry, supra n. 90, at 637 (quoting the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984).
331. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A) (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
332. See supra nn. 89-93 and accompanying text
333. See id; see also Berry, supra n. 90, at 661 (calling the Sentencing Guidelines
"intellectually bankrupt" and asserting that they include "no intelligible philosophical
principle by which sentences are considered or justified").
334. Miller, supra n. 4, at 428.
335. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
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this parsimony provision, Congress specifically delegated to the
courts the duty and the authority to consider and interpret the
statutory factors as they are applied in specific cases. 36 This
authority does not replace Congressional authority to enact
conflicting or additional sentencing laws or policies and of
course legislative enactments would always take precedence
over judicially created common law. However, in the absence of
legislative guidance, the courts can and should fill the gaps. 337
Nor does the judicial contribution to the common law of
sentencing prevent the Sentencing Commission from fulfilling
its duty to "establish sentencing policies and practices" for the
federal criminal justice system that: " (1) "assure the meeting of
the [§ 3553(a)] purposes of sentencing," (2) "provide certainty
and fairness," (3) "avoid[] unwarranted sentencing disparities,"
and (4) "reflect . . . advancement in knowledge of human
behavior."338 Indeed, England's Sentencing Council was created
in the 1980s because developing a law of sentencing solely
through the common law courts was found to be an inadequate
means of establishing system-wide sentencing principles. 339
It is perhaps uncontroversial to state, then, that a central
agency, divorced from the case or controversy requirement, and
having the time and resources necessary to conduct empirical
and sociological research and to consult public opinion, should
have a hand in developing policies that affect the entire criminal
justice system. Following this logic, the Supreme Court
announced in Kimbrough that it had "preserved a key role for
the Sentencing Commission" in the post-Booker sentencing
regime, 340 holding that advisory guidelines issued after the
Sentencing Commission has "exercise[d] its characteristic
institutional role" by researching and compiling "empirical data
336. Miller, supra n. 4, at 426-28.
337. Of course, the federal courts of appeals have historically rejected any opportunity to
provide meaningful guidance on sentencing policy. See Reitz, supra n. 9, at 1458-71
(describing the federal appellate role as largely a self-imposed enforcement function);
Berman, supra n. 4, at 102-06 (lamenting "the judiciary's failure to fulfill its lawmaking
role" in the sentencing process). However, as a result of the Supreme Court's mandates in
Booker and subsequent cases, the appellate role has been broadened beyond mere
enforcement, and thus the courts of appeals must rethink their former unwillingness to
articulate sentencing policy via appellate review.
338. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1).
339. See supra nn. 177-84 and accompanying text.
340. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 108.
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and national experience"341 would be entitled to judicial
deference.342 As shown through the English experience, the
federal sentencing Commission and the federal courts can work
in tandem, as they do in England, to ensure that they are
respectful to each other's expertise in creating a consistent and
fair justice system. So long as judicial deference to Commission
guidance does not consist only of blind acceptance of guidelines
ranges (thus equating to mere guidelines enforcement), the
Supreme Court's Kimbrough approach appears to be a sensible
practice in a system that relies on the development of consistent,
rational, and well-informed sentencing principles.
2. Concerns about Cost and the Expansion ofAppellate Review
Another criticism of robust appellate review is the added
cost and expense that could result from a substantial increase in
the appellate docket. Certainly cost is a legitimate concern,
especially in today's environment of budget cutbacks and
difficulty in confirming federal appellate judges. However, the
English experience suggests that the model of appellate review
proposed here is feasible despite these concerns.
First, the federal courts of appeals could enact limits on
appellate review to narrow the number of issues on appeal. For
example, as in England, they would continue to review factual
findings for clear error. Also, once the court of appeals
determines that the district court has committed no legal error
(including an error in sentencing principles), it can then review
with deference--only for reasonableness or abuse of
discretion-the choice of sentence and the application of
sentencing principles and law to the facts. As an example, in a
case like McBride,3 4 3 a court of appeals could review for
reasonableness the trial court's decision that a defendant had a
sufficient history of hands-on sexual exploitation to warrant
making incapacitation the primary goal of his sentencing in a
child-pornography case. It could also review with deference the
ultimate choice of sentence as one that properly reaches that
goal.
341. Id. at 109.
342. Id. at 108-10.
343. See supra text accompanying nn. 53-63.
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Furthermore, courts of appeals could limit reasonableness
review appeals by continuing a modified version of the current
federal "presumption of reasonableness," by which the court of
appeals presumes that a sentence is reasonable if it is within the
guidelines range.344 In Rita the Court endorsed the presumption
of reasonableness as both constitutional and practical,345
explaining that the presumption "simply recognizes the real-
world circumstance that when the judge's discretionary decision
accords with the Commission's view of the appropriate
application of § 3553(a) in the mine run of cases, it is probable
that the sentence is reasonable." 346
However, the presumption of reasonableness would have to
change in one material respect under my proposed model: The
presumption cannot apply to review of sentencing principles
because they are matters of law that appellate courts should
review de novo, regardless of whether the sentence is inside or
outside of the guidelines range. But this should not result in a
significant expansion of the burden on the federal courts of
appeals. Appellants would be responsible for identifying specific
errors in sentencing principles applied by the district courts and
explaining their significance. Ours is not a system in which the
appellant simply makes a request for resentencing, or a mere
statement that the sentence is in some way unfair or is too high.
And even in the English system, where the Court of Appeal has
the power to modify sentences, appellants must state specific
reasons for appealing a sentence.
344. This presumption is essentially a version of the no-tinker rule, under which the
English Court of Appeal does not interfere with a sentencing court's decision on the length
of a sentence if it is within the guidelines range. See supra nn. 226-32 and accompanying
text.
345. Rita, 551 U.S. at 347, 350-54.
346. Id. at 350-51.
347. The Notice and Grounds form that defendants must complete to appeal their
sentences specifically states that appeals must be "accompanied by detailed reasons" to be
accepted for review. And it provides further that appeals with "[w]ording such as . . . 'the
sentence is in all the circumstances too severe' will be rejected." Form NG-Notice and
Grounds of appeal or application for permission to appeal against conviction or sentence
to The Court ofAppeal Criminal Division 8, http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-
rules/criminal/formspage (Jan. 2012) (scroll down to Part 68 "Appeal to the Court of
Appeal about conviction or sentence"; click on "CrimPR Part 68, Rule 68.3 Notice and
Grounds of Appeal, or application for permission to appeal, against conviction or sentence
to the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division [CAO form NG]") (accessed Sept. 30, 2013;
copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
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Ultimately, the limited review for legal error I propose
should not result in significant expansion of appellate review. In
fact, to the contrary, final resolution of legal issues at the
appellate level would surely result in fewer redundant appeals
and clearer, more efficient outcomes. However, even if some
slight increase in the appellate docket were to result, this is a
price we should pay to ensure consistent application of
sentencing law throughout the federal courts. 34 8
3. Concerns about the Effect of Plea Bargaining on Appellate
Review
Finally, I would be remiss if I failed to consider the role
that plea bargaining plays in the federal sentencing process.
About ninety-seven percent of all federal criminal sentences
arise from guilty pleas, rather than trials.34 9 As a practical
matter, this means that the overwhelming majority of sentences
result from bargaining rather than from the application of
sentencing guidelines and principles by a sentencing judge.
Furthermore, many defendants who plead guilty through a plea
348. Of course, other cost-saving measures are available and are in fact used in England.
For example, the English Court of Appeal uses a screening procedure to control the volume
of appeals that reach the full court. Most applications for criminal appeals are first sent to a
single judge of the Court of Appeal, who will then review the application "in chambers" to
decide whether to grant leave to appeal to the full court. Sprack, supra n. 145, at 485-86,
488-89 (describing the single-judge process). Such a measure would undoubtedly be
controversial if applied in the United States. As another example, only sentences imposed
by the crown courts may be appealed to the Criminal Division, effectively meaning that
only crimes punishable by up to one year in prison can be appealed. See supra n. 168.
Although proposals for limiting the appellate jurisdiction of the federal courts in criminal
cases to felonies have been considered in the United States, see ABA Project on Minimum
Standards for Criminal Justice-Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences 13-
20, 86-88 (1st ed. ABA 1969) (discussing practical reasons for limiting the types of
sentencing cases heard on appeal and collecting specific bills introduced in Congress in the
1960s to limit appellate review to felony cases), such proposals seem highly unlikely to
win support today.
349. See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal
Justice Statistics Online, at tbl. 5.34.2010, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t534
2010.pdf (showing that, in fiscal year 2010, 81,217 of 83,941 criminal defendants in
federal district courts pled guilty) (accessed Sept. 30, 2013; copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process).
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bargain-perhaps as many as two thirds-also waive their right
to appeal their sentences. 3 5 0
These characteristics of the system in the United States are
in sharp contrast to the English system, even though plea
bargaining is commonplace in England. Defendants in the
English system are encouraged to plead guilty by: (1) a statutory
sentence discount of up to one-third, depending on when the
defendant pleads guilty, and 2) fact-and-charge bargaining with
the prosecuting barrister. However, English prosecutors
cannot bargain with a defendant by promising a certain sentence
length.352 Until quite recently, they could not even recommend a
certain sentence length to the judge 353 because sentencing is
seen in England as "uniquely judicial in nature." 354 While
defendants in England can predict their sentences by applying
the sentencing guidelines and statutory guilty plea discount,
sentencing judges still make discretionary-and appealable-
sentencing decisions in each case.
The heightened role that plea bargaining plays in the
United States leads to questions about the value of appellate
review as a source of sentencing law. Specifically, can a
common law of sentencing result despite a low rate of appeal?
And, if it can, will any common law of sentencing that develops
adequately cover the full extent of federal sentencing law?355
Here again, my study of the English experience provides
some insight on these points. First, it shows that an appellate
common law of sentencing is feasible, despite limits on the rate
of appeals. Sentences are appealed at similar low rates in
350. See Nancy J. King & Michael E. O'Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of
Sentencing Policy, 55 Duke L.J. 209, 212 (2005).
351. Ashworth, supra n. 145, at 170-75, 377; Daniele Alge, Negotiated Plea
Agreements in Cases of Serious and Complex Fraud in England and Wales: A New
Conceptualisation of Plea Bargaining? 19(1) Web JCLI, http://ojs.qub.ac.uk/index.php/
webjcli/article/view/203/272 (2013).
352. Ashworth, supra n. 145, at 377-78 (noting that the code of conduct for the bar
provides that "the prosecutor 'should not attempt by advocacy to influence the court in
regard to sentence').
353. Michael Tonry, Prosecutors and Politics in Comparative Perspective, 41 Crime &
Just. 1, 25 (2012).
354. Id. (citing Ashworth, supra n. 145).
355. See King & O'Neill, supra n. 350, at 211-13 (arguing that appellate waivers
diminish the value of appellate review as a source of consistent and uniform sentencing
policy).
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England and in the federal courts of the United States. Only
about two percent of criminal sentences are appealed in
England,356 compared to a seven percent appeal rate for criminal
sentences in the federal courts of the United States.357 Even with
this low rate of appeal, the Court of Appeal in England has been
able to develop a common law of sentencing.
Federal appellate courts undoubtedly have plenty of
opportunities to hear sentencing issues: 5,875 appeals of
sentences were commenced in the federal courts of appeals in
2011.358 However, because it is impossible to determine how
many of these appeals would have presented genuine issues of
sentencing law or policy, as opposed to issues of fact or
discretionary issues, it is difficult to determine how many would
have presented opportunities to develop sentencing common
law. But further evidence can be found by comparing to appeals
in other areas of the law. In 2011, approximately five percent of
non-prisoner, non-bankruptcy private civil claims were appealed
in federal courts359-a number not all that different from the
356. See Ministry of Justice, Judicial and Court Statistics 2011, https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachmentdata/file/217494/judicial-court-stats-2011
.pdf at 11 (June 28, 2012) (recording 7,475 applications to appeal criminal sentences in
fiscal year 2011) (accessed Oct. 1, 2013; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice
and Process); Ministry of Justice, Statistics Bulletin, Criminal Justice Statistics-June 2012,
Sentencing Tables-June 2012 tbl. Q5.1, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
criminal-justice-statistics-in-england-and-wales-earlier-editions-in-the-series (recording that
347,342 criminal defendants were sentenced on indictable offences in 2011).
357. See Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice
Statistics Online, http://www.ussc.gov/Research-and-Statistics/AnnualReports-and-Source
books/201 1/Table55.pdf (accessed Oct. 21, 2013; copy on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process). Appeal rates are derived by dividing the number of appeals filed by
the number of defendants convicted that year.
358. Id.
359. The private civil appeal rate-four percent-was derived by dividing the 12,646
"Other Private Civil" appeals commenced during the year ending in March 2012 by the
243,195 of those cases terminated in United States District Courts during the year ending in
March 2012. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, United States Courts, Caseload
Statistics 2012, http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/Federal
JudicialCaseloadStatistics/2012/tables/BO1Marl2.pdf (Table Bl: U.S. Courts ofAppeals-
Appeals Commenced, Terminated, and Pending, by Circuit, During the 12-Month Period
Ending March 31, 2012); Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, United States Courts,
Caseload Statistics 2012, http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/ Statistics/
FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2012/tables/COI Marl 2.pdf (Table Cl: U.S. District
Courts-Civil Cases Commenced, Terminated, and Pending During the 12-Month Period
Ending March 31, 2012) (both accessed Oct. 9, 2013; copies on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process).
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seven percent appeal rate of criminal sentences. Nevertheless,
common law has successfully developed across the spectrum of
federal private civil law, including in copyright, patent, and
employment discrimination, to name just a few. This is how
common law develops: through a deliberate process of resolving
issues in actual cases, that over time results in the development
of a body of law.
While these numbers should calm some concerns related to
the opportunities to hear sentencing issues at the appellate level,
it does not solve the second concern that the issues making it to
the appellate courts may not be representative of the whole
range of potential sentencing law. Thus, plea "bargaining skews
appellate lawmaking because rules that survive the bargaining
process receive attention and development that rules waived as
part of bargains do not." 3 60 As a result there is a danger that
appellate lawmaking will result in distorted law. 36 1
There can be no doubt as to the validity of this concern,
especially considering the inequities that have been widely
documented as a result of plea bargaining and the powers of
prosecutors in the federal system. But the English experience
both supports this concern, and provides a fix. English experts
recognized that appellate development of sentencing common
law was not a perfect model, and, in particular that the Court of
Appeal was unable to adequately address system-wide
sentencing issues. Accordingly, Parliament established a source
of sentencing law and policy other than that generated by the
appellate court, creating the Sentencing Council in the 1980s
precisely to fill the gaps in sentencing law left by the judiciary at
the time.362
My proposal would follow England's lead, suggesting that
the federal Sentencing Commission would continue to provide
guidance on sentencing issues that are not being reached by the
federal courts of appeals. To the extent that limits on the
appellate court function-including limits caused by plea
bargaining design flaws-make those courts unable to reach the
full body of sentencing law, the Commission could, and should,
step in to fill the gaps.
360. King & O'Neill, supra n. 350, at 253.
361. Id. at 252-53.
362. See supra nn. 177-84 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, if the English experience shows us anything, it
is that the appellate role cannot fit into a binary mold as is often
assumed here in the United States. The appellate function in
sentencing is not limited to either enforcement or lawmaking; it
can include aspects of both. Nor does the standard of review
have to be either de novo or full deference; it can include a mix
of both. And appellate review does not automatically inhibit
individualized sentences; appellate review can expand to guide
sentencing discretion in a way that retains the kind of discretion
necessary to sentence each individual as appropriate in a
particular case. Blind acceptance of deference as an institutional
model based on assumptions like these is not only inaccurate,
but may lead to the rejection of reforms at the appellate level
that could further the goals of uniformity and fairness in
sentencing.
In rendering the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory,
the Supreme Court has explained that it expects appellate review
to play a prominent role in providing the sentencing consistency
that the now-advisory Guidelines cannot. However, as cases like
Kimbrough and McBride show, such consistency is unlikely to
occur without reform like robust substantive appellate review of
criminal sentences. The mixed-deference model of appellate
review practiced in England shows how an appellate court can
review sentencing decisions for substantive reasonableness
without unwarranted encroachment on discretion of .sentencing
judges and without over-enforcement of the Guidelines. My
proposal borrows the aspects of English appellate review that
would allow the appellate courts and the Sentencing
Commission to share responsibility for issuing general guidance
on sentencing policies. Through this approach, the sentencing
common law developed in the federal courts of appeals would
work in tandem with the advisory federal Guidelines, providing
sentencing courts with benchmarks to guide the sentencing
decision while allowing for the discretion needed in the trial
courts to reach individualized sentences.
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